Summary. Everything a connected device maker has to build, in the order that matters.
Phase 1 — Ownership and governance
- A named owner of product security.
- Reporting line that does not run through the person accountable for the ship date.
- Authority to stop a shipment, or a documented escalation path to someone who has it.
- Standing monthly forum: engineering, legal, product safety, communications.
- Legal integrated into the incident process from the start.
- Executive review quarterly, covering backlog, support commitments, and residual unpatched populations.
Phase 2 — Vulnerability disclosure policy
- Published at a discoverable URL and in a
security.txtfile. - A monitored
security@address that does NOT route through general support. - Acknowledgment commitment (two business days is reasonable).
- Triage commitment.
- Coordinated disclosure timeline stated (commonly 90 days), with good-faith negotiation.
- Safe harbor language — no legal action for good-faith research within scope.
- Scope defined: what products, what testing is out of bounds.
- What a reporter should include.
- Bounty terms if offered.
- Note the limits: cannot waive third-party claims or criminal exposure under 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
- Never threaten a researcher.
Phase 3 — Triage process
- Intake acknowledged within the committed period.
- Validation and reproduction, with a target.
- Severity assigned using a documented scale.
- Exploitability in a shipped configuration assessed.
- Active exploitation checked.
- PRODUCT SAFETY ANALYSIS RUN ON EVERY REPORT — does it defeat or degrade a safety function? Could it create a substantial product hazard under 15 U.S.C. § 2064 and 16 C.F.R. Part 1115?
- The person running that analysis knows the standard, and sees every report.
- Remediation plan with owner, timeline, and release vehicle.
- Disclosure coordination with the reporter.
- Customer notification decision.
- Update adoption tracked after release.
- Post-incident review.
Failure mode: a report sitting in a support queue for nine days while the reporting clock runs.
Phase 4 — Remediation timelines
- Documented severity scale.
- Critical / actively exploited: days, out-of-band release.
- High: 2–4 weeks.
- Medium: next scheduled release.
- Low: next major release, or accept with documentation.
- Every deferral has a written rationale and a named approver.
- Items past target tracked and reported.
Phase 5 — Component inventory
- Generated automatically at build, not assembled on demand.
- Covers firmware, application software, and bundled third-party code.
- Direct and transitive dependencies, with versions and suppliers.
- Machine-readable, standard format.
- Retained for every version still in the field.
- Monitored against vulnerability feeds, alerts routed to a named owner.
- Test: can you answer "are we affected?" for a new industry-wide vulnerability within hours?
- Exploitability assessed separately — presence is not exposure, and communicate the distinction clearly.
Phase 6 — Support period
- A period chosen and funded (commonly measured from last date of sale).
- Disclosed before purchase: product page, packaging, documentation, and in-product where there is a screen.
- Supplier support periods confirmed to match or exceed it.
- Budget accounts for maintaining multiple firmware branches concurrently.
- Silence is not an option — it creates an expectation of indefinite support.
Phase 7 — Update mechanism
- No connected product ships without one. Written design requirement.
- Signed firmware with verification.
- Rollback protection.
- Delivery works through ordinary consumer and enterprise network configurations.
- Automatic by default, with visible status.
- Telemetry sufficient to measure adoption at 7, 30, and 90 days.
- Legacy products without a mechanism identified, counted, and a plan documented.
Phase 8 — Secure development
- No shared default credentials — unique per device or forced setting at first use.
- Encryption in transit and at rest for sensitive data; certificate validation enforced.
- Secure defaults; exposure-increasing features off unless enabled.
- Debug interfaces disabled in production; unnecessary services removed.
- Data minimization — collect only what the product needs.
- Logging sufficient to determine whether a vulnerability was exploited.
- Threat modeling at design, documented.
- Security testing before release, documented.
- Third-party component review at selection, including supplier support period.
- Documentation retained — it is the answer when a regulator asks what was done.
Phase 9 — Marketing claim review
- Review gate before publication for: "secure," "encrypted," "protected," "private."
- Certification and standards claims verified.
- Support period statements checked against the actual commitment.
- Comparative security claims substantiated.
- Test applied: could an engineer demonstrate this is true today, and will it remain true?
- Note that inaccurate security claims are the easiest enforcement case under 15 U.S.C. § 45.
Phase 10 — Supplier requirements
- Component inventory delivered with each release.
- Security requirements the component must meet.
- Vulnerability notification within a defined period.
- Severity-based remediation commitments.
- Support period matching or exceeding yours.
- Source escrow or step-in rights.
- Cooperation in incident response and regulatory reporting.
- Indemnity for security defects.
- Audit or attestation rights.
- Flow-down to their suppliers.
- For contract-manufactured or white-label products: who reports to regulators, stated expressly.
Phase 11 — Recall and corrective action
- Reporting decision is separate from the remedy decision — the obligation attaches on information reasonably supporting the conclusion, not after a remedy is chosen.
- Remedy options assessed: automatic update / user-action update / server-side mitigation / configuration guidance / feature disablement / repair or replacement / refund.
- Update mechanism reach measured, not assumed.
- Residual population after the campaign quantified.
- Affected owners identifiable? Registration, retailer, cloud account, warranty records.
- Campaign run through every channel, with completion tracking.
- Decision memorandum documenting what was known, options considered, and why the remedy was adequate.
- Penalties noted: 15 U.S.C. § 2068 prohibited acts; 15 U.S.C. § 2069 civil penalties.
Phase 12 — Multi-jurisdiction reporting
- Decision tree built in advance, per product line: markets, authorities, triggers, deadlines, filer, template.
- Deadlines mapped — some are measured in hours for actively exploited vulnerabilities.
- One set of facts across all filings.
- Initial notifications filed on time even if incomplete; supplements tracked.
- Named filer and backup for each jurisdiction.
- Customer communication sequenced so customers do not learn from a public database first.
- Everything retained, including documented decisions not to report with the standard applied.
Phase 13 — End of support
- Notification sequence: 12 months, 6 months, 90 days, 30 days, through every channel.
- Operational meaning decided: critical-only updates / basic function without cloud / local-only mode / trade-in / stop with notice.
- Cloud dependency addressed — does the device become inert when servers shut down?
- Stop selling, or disclose remaining support prominently on clearance.
- Residual safety duty recognized: a serious flaw may still require reporting after support ends.
Phase 14 — Sectoral overlays
- Medical devices: premarket security documentation; postmarket vulnerability management; correction and removal reporting.
- Vehicles: software defects as safety defects; security program expectations.
- Financial data: 15 U.S.C. § 6801 safeguards program.
- Critical infrastructure: sector directives and incident reporting.
- Children's products: 15 U.S.C. § 6501 and 16 C.F.R. Part 312 — persistent identifiers are personal information.
- Wireless equipment: authorization requirements under 47 U.S.C. § 302a.
Phase 15 — Metrics
Track and review monthly with engineering, quarterly with executives:
- Time from report to acknowledgment
- Time from acknowledgment to severity assignment
- Time from severity to fix released, by severity
- Backlog age distribution
- Items past remediation target
- Update adoption at 7, 30, 90 days
- Residual unpatched population by product
- Products shipping without an update mechanism (target: zero)
- Products in field past stated support period
- Component inventory currency
- Time to answer "are we affected?" for a new industry-wide vulnerability
- Marketing claims reviewed before publication
Related documents
- Connected Device Security and Software Liability: Regulators, Standards, and the Duty to Patch
- Building a Product Security Program for Connected Devices: A Practical Guide
- Product Security Toolkit: SBOMs, Vulnerability Disclosure, and Recall Decisions
- Vendor Cybersecurity Diligence Checklist: A Practical Checklist
- HIPAA Security Rule Risk Analysis Checklist: A Practical Checklist
- Business Continuity and Crisis Response Checklist: A Practical Checklist
- Open Source Software Compliance Checklist: A Practical Checklist
