Summary. A working kit for recovering and resisting litigation fees and costs: a fee-shifting map, a lodestar worksheet with the billing judgment and apportionment tables built in, document templates from the motion through the bill of costs, an opposition outline, and the primary authorities.
SECTION A — THE FEE-SHIFTING MAP
A-1. Federal statutes in common use
| Statute | Trigger | Direction in practice |
|---|---|---|
| 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (civil rights) | Prevailing party, court's discretion | One-way in practice — defendants only if frivolous (Christiansburg) |
| Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) | Prevailing party | Same asymmetry |
| ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 | Prevailing party | Same asymmetry |
| FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) | Prevailing plaintiff | Mandatory to prevailing employee |
| FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k | Successful consumer | One-way, with a bad-faith carve-out for defendants |
| TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 | Successful consumer | One-way |
| ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) | Discretionary; "some degree of success on the merits" (Hardt) | Either party |
| Copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 505 | Prevailing party, discretionary | Either party, multi-factor |
| Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) | "Exceptional cases" | Either party |
| Patent, 35 U.S.C. § 285 | "Exceptional cases" | Either party |
| Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 | Prevailing plaintiff | One-way, mandatory, plus treble damages |
| FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) | Substantially prevailed | Against the government |
| EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 | Prevailing party; government position not substantially justified | Against the government; rate cap and net worth limit |
| PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) | Prevailing prisoner | Capped rate; up to 25% of judgment applied first (Murphy v. Smith) |
A-2. State provisions — the categories to check
- Consumer protection acts — usually one-way to the consumer; the practical engine of small-claim enforcement.
- Wage and hour acts — usually one-way to the employee, often mandatory.
- Landlord-tenant acts — frequently one-way to the tenant, and frequently overlooked.
- Mechanic's lien and prompt payment statutes — usually to the prevailing claimant.
- Open records and open meetings acts — to the requester who prevails; the enforcement mechanism for transparency law.
- Private attorney general statutes (e.g., California CCP § 1021.5) — the theory Alyeska rejected federally, alive in some states.
- Reciprocity statutes (e.g., California Civil Code § 1717) — convert one-way contractual clauses into mutual ones.
- Offer-of-judgment rules — several states are two-directional and shift expert fees as well.
- Frivolous claim statutes — a state-law analogue to Rule 11 with its own procedure.
A-3. Model contractual fee clauses
Mutual, broad scope:
Attorneys' Fees. In any action, arbitration, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement, including any action to enforce, interpret, rescind, or declare rights under it, and including any appeal or any proceeding in bankruptcy, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees, and costs, whether or not taxable, in addition to any other relief awarded. The "prevailing party" is the party that obtains the greater net monetary recovery, or, where no monetary relief is awarded, the party that obtains substantially the relief it sought.
Fee-shifting limited to specified breaches:
The prevailing party shall recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in any action to collect amounts due under Section [] or to enforce Section [] (Confidentiality) or Section [__] (Intellectual Property). In all other actions arising out of this Agreement, each party shall bear its own fees and costs.
Drafting notes. Broad scope language captures related tort and statutory claims that narrow "action to enforce" language may not. Defining the prevailing party avoids a satellite dispute where both sides win something. Several states convert one-way clauses into mutual ones regardless of drafting, so a unilateral clause may create the exposure it was meant to avoid. And a clause that purports to shift fees in a consumer transaction may be restricted or void under state law — check before using.
SECTION B — LODESTAR WORKSHEET
Step 1 — Raw lodestar
| Timekeeper | Role / years | Rate | Hours | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Raw total |
Step 2 — Billing judgment (apply before filing)
| Category | Hours removed | Basis | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clerical work at professional rates | Filing, calendaring, Bates, binders | ||
| Duplicative attendance | Second attendee at depositions/hearings | ||
| Travel | Reduced to half rate per local practice | ||
| Vague entries | Insufficiently specific to review | ||
| Excessive time | Disproportionate to the task | ||
| Total voluntary reduction |
Adjusted lodestar: ____________
Step 3 — Apportionment
| Claim | Outcome | Related or distinct? | Hours solely attributable | Removed? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Related = common core of facts or related legal theories (Hensley). Distinct = removed under the but-for standard (Fox v. Vice).
Step 4 — Rate determination
| Timekeeper | Requested | Supported by | Court's rate | Adjustment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Declarations / prior awards / survey |
Step 5 — Degree of success adjustment: ____ % → ____________
Step 6 — Fees on fees: + ____________
TOTAL FEE REQUEST: ____________
Separate — taxable costs (§ 1920 only): ____________
SECTION C — TEMPLATES
C-1. Fee motion skeleton
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiff moves under [statute § ___ / Section __ of the Agreement]
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) for an award of $______ in attorneys'
fees and $______ in costs, and states:
1. Judgment was entered in Plaintiff's favor on [date] (ECF __).
2. [Statute] provides that the court [may/shall] award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party.
3. Plaintiff is the prevailing party: [judgment / consent decree].
4. The requested fee is the product of reasonable rates and
reasonable hours, after voluntary reductions of $______.
5. The motion is supported by the Declaration of ______, the
Declarations of ______ and ______ on prevailing market rates,
the time records at Exhibit A, and the summary tables at
Exhibits B–E.
MEMORANDUM
I. Entitlement
II. The lodestar
A. Reasonable rates (Blum)
B. Reasonable hours and billing judgment (Hensley)
C. Apportionment (Hensley; Fox v. Vice)
III. Degree of success
IV. [Enhancement, if any — Perdue]
V. Fees on fees
VI. Costs (§ 1920)
C-2. Lead counsel declaration — required content
1. Identity, admission, and role in this matter.
2. The engagement: date, terms, fee arrangement, amounts paid.
3. Timekeepers table: name | role | admitted | experience | rate.
4. Timekeeping practice: contemporaneous, in [system], by task,
minimum increment of ___.
5. The work, by phase (2 sentences each):
pleadings | written discovery | depositions | motions |
trial | post-trial.
6. Results obtained: judgment, non-monetary relief, broader effect.
7. Billing judgment applied: category | hours | dollars, itemized.
8. Apportionment: claims that failed, hours removed, why the
remainder would have been incurred regardless.
9. Authentication of Exhibits A–E.
NOT in the declaration: argument, adjectives, or characterizations
of opposing counsel.
C-3. Market rate declaration — required content
I am admitted in [state] and practice [area] in [market]. My current hourly rate is $, and I have charged and collected that rate from paying clients since . I am familiar with the rates charged by attorneys of comparable experience in [market] because [basis: fee applications reviewed, co-counsel arrangements, hiring, bar committee service]. Based on that familiarity, and having reviewed [the docket / the description of the work], the rates of $ for a partner with __ years of experience and $ for an associate with __ years of experience are within the prevailing market range in [market] for this type of litigation. I have no financial interest in the outcome of this motion.
C-4. Bill of costs schedule
| § 1920 category | Item | Amount | Necessity |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Clerk/marshal fees | Filing fee; service of process | Statutory | |
| (2) Transcripts | Depositions of ___, ___, ___ | Used at SJ / trial — cite ECF | |
| (2) Transcripts | Hearing transcript of [date] | Used in [motion] | |
| (3) Printing and witness fees | Witness attendance and mileage | Testified at trial | |
| (4) Exemplification and copies | Trial exhibits; production copies | Necessarily obtained for use — explain | |
| (5) Docket fees § 1923 | Statutory | ||
| (6) Court-appointed expert/interpreter | Appointed by order [ECF __] | ||
| TOTAL |
Not claimed: retained expert fees beyond the attendance fee · legal research charges · counsel travel and lodging · mediation fees · postage and courier · e-discovery processing and hosting.
C-5. Offer of judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, Defendant offers to allow judgment to be taken against it in this action in the amount of $________, inclusive of all costs and attorneys' fees accrued through the date of this offer, in full satisfaction of all claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action.
This offer is made solely for the purposes of Rule 68 and is not an admission of liability. If this offer is not accepted within fourteen (14) days after service, it is deemed withdrawn, and Plaintiff may be liable for costs — including, where the underlying statute defines attorneys' fees as costs, post-offer attorneys' fees — incurred after the making of this offer.
Drafting notes. State clearly whether the offer includes costs and fees; ambiguity is construed against the offeror. Consider a separate offer that is exclusive of fees where the fee exposure is uncertain. Check the state analogue if the case is not in federal court — several are two-directional and shift expert fees.
C-6. Rule 11 safe harbor letter
Enclosed is a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 directed at [the specified paper]. As Rule 11(c)(2) requires, this motion is being served but not filed. If [the paper] is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within twenty-one (21) days of service, the motion will not be filed.
The specific conduct at issue is: [identify the contention, and why it lacks evidentiary support or is not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending it].
The single most important line in Rule 11 practice: serve, wait 21 days, then file. A motion filed without the safe harbor is denied regardless of its merit.
C-7. Fee settlement language
Fees resolved in the settlement:
Defendant shall pay Plaintiff's counsel $________ in full satisfaction of all claims for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses in this action, in addition to the settlement payment to Plaintiff described in Section __. This amount was negotiated separately and after the amount payable to Plaintiff was agreed.
Fees reserved:
The parties have not resolved Plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiff's counsel may file a motion under [statute] within [__] days of entry of the [judgment/consent decree], and Defendant reserves all defenses to that motion other than Plaintiff's status as a prevailing party, which Defendant does not contest.
The separate-negotiation recital in the first form addresses the conflict inherent in trading the client's recovery against counsel's fee. Where an offer is lump-sum or conditioned on a fee waiver, disclose the conflict to the client in writing and document the client's decision.
SECTION D — OPPOSITION OUTLINE
I. THRESHOLD — NO ENTITLEMENT
A. Applicant is not a prevailing party. Buckhannon: a private
settlement or voluntary compliance is not a judicially
sanctioned material alteration.
B. The statute's trigger is not met.
C. [Defendant-applicant] Christiansburg: the claim was not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Losing is
not frivolous, and post hoc reasoning is impermissible.
D. The motion is untimely / the claim was not pleaded.
II. THE RATE IS ABOVE MARKET
Declarations of local practitioners; prior awards of this court
[cite]; rate survey. Requested $___ vs. approved range $___–$___.
III. IDENTIFIABLE BLOCKS OF UNNECESSARY TIME
A. [Task]: __ hours for [describe]. Entries at Ex. __.
B. [Task]: __ hours. Entries at Ex. __.
C. [Task]: __ hours. Entries at Ex. __.
IV. APPORTIONMENT
Table: entry | date | hours | claim | sole attribution.
Fox v. Vice but-for standard.
V. STRUCTURAL DEFECTS
A. Block billing — __% of entries; proportionate cut requested.
B. Clerical work at professional rates — Ex. __.
C. Overstaffing — __ timekeepers at [event].
D. Vague entries — quoted at Ex. __.
E. No voluntary billing judgment.
F. Post-offer fees barred / at risk under Rule 68 and Marek.
VI. ENHANCEMENT IS FORECLOSED
Dague (contingency); Perdue (lodestar strongly presumed
reasonable; no specific evidence or objective method offered).
VII. COSTS EXCEED § 1920
Item-by-item: expert fees, research, travel, mediation,
e-discovery processing.
VIII. PROPOSED AWARD
A specific alternative number, computed. Never leave the court
with only the applicant's figure on the page.
SECTION E — PRIMARY AUTHORITY
- Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) — the American Rule; no general judicial power to shift fees.
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) — prevailing defendants recover only for frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claims.
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) — the lodestar, billing judgment, and the related-claims analysis.
- Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) — prevailing market rates, including for non-profit counsel.
- Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) — Rule 68 shifts attorney's fees where the statute defines fees as costs.
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) — inherent authority to shift fees for bad faith.
- City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) — no contingency enhancement.
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) — nominal damages; the reasonable fee may be no fee.
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia DHHR, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) — the catalyst theory rejected.
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) — enhancement only in rare and exceptional circumstances, on specific evidence.
- Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010) — ERISA's "some degree of success on the merits."
- Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011) — the but-for standard; courts need not be green-eyeshade accountants.
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101 (2017) — inherent-authority fee awards must be compensatory and causally limited.
- Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220 (2018) — the PLRA's 25% judgment offset.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 28 U.S.C. § 1920 · 28 U.S.C. § 1927
- FRCP 11 · FRCP 54 · FRCP 68
Related documents
- Attorneys Fees and Costs: The American Rule and Its Many Exceptions
- Preparing and Opposing a Fee Petition: A Practical Guide
- Attorney Fee Petition and Bill of Costs Checklist
- Civil Damages Toolkit
- Contract Construction Toolkit
- Law Practice Management and Professional Responsibility Toolkit
- Civil Rights Litigation Toolkit
- Government Transparency Toolkit
This toolkit is educational and not legal advice. Fee-shifting provisions, offer-of-judgment rules, cost taxation, and the enforceability of contractual fee clauses vary substantially by jurisdiction. Adapt every template to local rules and confirm the governing standard before filing.