Summary. When a licensor files for bankruptcy, the license a licensee's entire business depends on becomes a contract the debtor may reject. Congress addressed part of that problem in 1988 by adding § 365(n), which lets a licensee of "intellectual property" elect to retain its rights after rejection. But the Code's definition of intellectual property omits trademarks, which left trademark licensees exposed for three decades. The Supreme Court closed most of that gap in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, holding that rejection is a breach rather than a rescission and therefore does not terminate rights the contract already conveyed. This article explains the framework: when a license is executory, what rejection does, how § 365(n) elections work and what they cost, why trademarks were left out and what Mission Product did and did not fix, the separate and often more dangerous question of assumption and assignment under § 365(c), and what a § 363 sale free and clear means for a licensee. It closes with drafting and diligence measures, a worked example, an FAQ, and related reading.

Here is a scenario that has ruined more companies than most people realize.

A manufacturer licenses a patented process from a small technology firm. It builds a plant around it, hires two hundred people, and signs ten-year supply contracts with customers. Five years in, the licensor files for Chapter 11 and its financial advisors identify the license as an "underwater contract" because the royalty rate is below market. The debtor moves to reject it.

If the manufacturer loses its license, the plant is worthless and the supply contracts become breaches. The debtor's leverage is enormous, and the negotiation over what happens next is really a negotiation about how much of the manufacturer's business the estate can extract.

Section 365(n) exists to prevent exactly that, and understanding it, and its gaps, is essential for anyone whose business depends on licensed technology.

The short answer

  • A license is usually an executory contract, meaning both sides have material unperformed obligations. That makes it subject to assumption or rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
  • Rejection is a breach, not a rescission. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370 (2019). It gives the counterparty a prepetition damages claim under § 365(g) and § 502(g), which is usually worth pennies on the dollar. It does not rescind the contract or claw back rights already granted.
  • Section 365(n) gives a licensee of "intellectual property" a choice after rejection: treat the contract as terminated and claim damages, or retain its rights under the license for the balance of the term and any extension it may unilaterally elect.
  • "Intellectual property" in § 101(35A) means trade secrets, inventions and patent applications, patents, plant varieties, works of authorship protected under title 17, and mask works. It does not include trademarks.
  • Mission Product filled most of that gap for trademark licensees, holding that rejection cannot terminate a trademark license.
  • The bigger risk is often § 365(c), which may prevent the debtor from assuming or assigning the license at all where applicable non-bankruptcy law excuses the counterparty from accepting performance from another party. Patent, copyright, and trademark licenses are generally non-assignable without consent, which cuts both ways.

Part I: Executory contracts and rejection

Is the license executory?

The Code does not define "executory contract." Most courts use the Countryman definition: a contract under which the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach.

Typically executory: ongoing licenses with continuing royalty obligations, confidentiality duties, maintenance and support obligations, quality control obligations, notice and cooperation duties, and covenants not to sue.

Typically not executory: a fully paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable license where no material obligations remain on either side. That is a meaningful drafting objective for licensees: a fully paid-up perpetual license with no remaining licensee obligations is a much stronger position than a license with continuing duties, because there is nothing to reject.

Watch what makes a license executory from the licensee's side: continuing royalties, reporting obligations, audit cooperation, minimum purchase commitments, marking obligations, and quality control submissions. Each is a material obligation.

What rejection does

Section 365(g) provides that rejection "constitutes a breach of such contract" immediately before the petition date. Section 502(g) gives the counterparty a prepetition general unsecured claim for damages.

Mission Product settled a long-running debate about whether rejection is something more. Chief Justice Kagan's opinion is unusually clear:

A rejection breaches a contract but does not rescind it. And that means all the rights that would ordinarily survive a contract breach, including those conveyed here, remain in place.

The Court used a memorable analogy: if a landlord rejects a lease, "the tenant does not have to move out." The debtor stops performing and owes damages; it does not get the leasehold back.

The Court also rejected the argument that trademark licenses deserve special treatment because a licensor that cannot control quality risks losing the mark. That, the Court said, is a consequence of trademark law that the licensor must manage, not a reason to read the Bankruptcy Code to give debtors an extraordinary rescission power. See Trademark Licensing and Quality Control.

The history that made this necessary

Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), held that rejection of a technology license terminated the licensee's right to use the technology, leaving it with only a damages claim. The decision alarmed the technology industry, because it meant any licensor's bankruptcy could destroy a licensee's business.

Congress responded in 1988 with the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, adding § 365(n) and the § 101(35A) definition. The legislative history is explicit that Congress was overruling Lubrizol.

Trademarks were deliberately omitted, and the Senate Report said so: the treatment of trademark, trade name, and service mark licenses was left "to the development of equitable treatment" by the courts, because the quality control issues required more study. That study never happened, and the omission left a thirty-year gap.

The Seventh Circuit filled it first. Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), Judge Easterbrook writing, held that the omission of trademarks from § 365(n) does not imply that rejection terminates a trademark license. "[A]n omission is just an omission." Because rejection is a breach, "the debtor's unfulfilled obligations remain," and the licensee's rights survive.

Mission Product adopted that reasoning and resolved a split with the First Circuit.

Part II: Section 365(n) in operation

The election

When a debtor-licensor rejects a license of "intellectual property," the licensee may elect under § 365(n)(1) to:

(A) Treat the contract as terminated, if the rejection amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat it as terminated under the contract, applicable non-bankruptcy law, or an agreement by the licensee with another entity; or

(B) Retain its rights (including a right to enforce an exclusivity provision, but excluding any other right under applicable non-bankruptcy law to specific performance) under the contract and under any agreement supplementary to it, as they existed immediately before the case commenced, for the duration of the contract and any period for which the contract may be extended by the licensee as of right under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

What retention costs

Electing to retain is not free. Under § 365(n)(2), the licensee:

  • Must continue to make all royalty payments due under the contract for the duration of the contract;
  • Is deemed to waive any right of setoff it may have with respect to the contract under the Code or applicable non-bankruptcy law; and
  • Is deemed to waive any claim allowable under § 503(b) arising from performance under the contract (that is, an administrative expense claim).

That last point matters. A licensee who elects retention gives up administrative priority for post-petition performance. The trade is: keep the technology, keep paying, give up leverage.

What the licensee gets

Under § 365(n)(3), on the licensee's written request, the trustee shall:

  • Provide to the licensee any intellectual property held by the trustee; and
  • Not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in the contract or any supplementary agreement, including any right to obtain the intellectual property from another entity.

That second clause is the escrow provision: it makes source code and technical data escrow arrangements enforceable against the estate. A licensee with a properly structured escrow and a § 365(n) election can obtain the deposited materials.

What the licensee does not get

  • No specific performance of the licensor's other obligations. The debtor is not required to continue development, maintenance, support, updates, training, or defense of the IP.
  • No new IP. The rights retained are those "as they existed immediately before the case commenced." Improvements developed post-petition are not included unless the contract already conveyed them and they existed pre-petition.
  • No relief from royalty obligations, even though the licensor has stopped performing.
  • No setoff to reduce royalties by the value of lost support.

Section 365(n)(4) requires that, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee perform the contract or provide the IP pending the licensee's election, and § 365(n)(4)(B) requires the trustee not to interfere with third parties' obligations to provide the IP.

Exclusivity survives

Section 365(n)(1)(B) expressly preserves "a right to enforce any exclusivity provision." An exclusive licensee that elects retention keeps its exclusivity, which is a substantial protection and one that debtors sometimes try to argue around.

Part III: What Mission Product did not resolve

The decision was narrow in an important respect. It held that rejection does not terminate the licensee's rights. It did not:

Address quality control. The Court acknowledged the licensor's concern that continued use without control could jeopardize the mark, and answered that this is a feature of trademark law rather than a reason to rewrite the Code. It did not say what happens to the estate's mark when a rejected licensee continues using it without any control. That is a real and unresolved problem for the estate, and it gives a licensee negotiating leverage.

Define what rights "survive." Rejection is a breach; the surviving rights are those the contract conveyed and that would survive a breach under applicable non-bankruptcy law. If the license by its terms terminates on the licensor's material breach at the licensee's election, the licensee may choose termination. If the license terminates automatically on insolvency, an ipso facto clause, § 365(e)(1) generally makes that unenforceable.

Resolve assignment. See below; this is the bigger problem.

Establish a § 365(n)-style payment framework for trademarks. A trademark licensee retaining rights after rejection is in a somewhat undefined position: it presumably must continue performing to retain the benefit, but the statutory mechanics of § 365(n)(2) do not apply. Courts have handled this pragmatically, and licensees should expect to keep paying.

Part IV: The assignment problem under § 365(c)

This is the risk most licensees underestimate, and it runs in both directions.

The rule

Section 365(c)(1) provides that a trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract if "applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, ... from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor," and that party does not consent.

Applicable non-bankruptcy law makes IP licenses non-assignable. Federal common law holds that a patent license is personal and non-assignable without consent. Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996). The same rule applies to nonexclusive copyright licenses in most circuits, and to trademark licenses. In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding that a trademark sublicense could not be assigned without consent, and remanding on whether the license had been effectively removed from the contract).

The hypothetical versus actual test

Here is where it gets strange. The statute says a trustee may not "assume or assign." Courts split on what that means for a debtor that wants to assume and keep performing itself:

  • The hypothetical test (Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits): if applicable law would bar assignment to a hypothetical third party, the debtor may not assume the contract at all, even if it has no intention of assigning it. In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999).
  • The actual test (First and Fifth Circuits, and many bankruptcy courts): the question is whether the debtor actually intends to assign. If the debtor will continue performing itself, assumption is permitted. Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).

Why this matters enormously. Under the hypothetical test, a debtor-licensee in a jurisdiction like the Ninth Circuit may be unable to assume its own patent licenses, which can destroy the reorganization value of a technology company that operates on in-licensed IP. Debtors have restructured, changed venue, and negotiated consents specifically to manage this.

For a licensor in bankruptcy, the flip side is that the licensee's consent may be required for the estate to move the license as part of a sale, which is real negotiating leverage for the licensee.

In re Exide and the "materially breached" escape

In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), took a different route: it held that an agreement including a perpetual, exclusive, royalty-free trademark license was not executory, because the licensee's remaining obligations (a quality standards provision, an indemnification, and a use restriction) were not material enough that failure would constitute a material breach. A non-executory contract cannot be rejected at all.

Exide is the licensee's best structural argument and the reason to draft toward a fully paid-up, perpetual license with minimal continuing licensee obligations.

Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.), 751 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc), reached a similar result on similar reasoning in the context of an asset purchase agreement and a related perpetual trademark license, examining the agreements together as an integrated transaction.

Part V: Section 363 sales

Most modern bankruptcies resolve through a sale of assets under § 363 rather than a plan, and licensees often first learn of the problem when they receive a sale notice.

Section 363(f) permits a sale "free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate" if one of five conditions is met.

The question that matters: is the licensee's license an "interest" that can be stripped?

  • The better and majority view is that a license is a property interest in the licensed IP, and that a sale free and clear cannot extinguish it where the licensee has § 365(n) protection or where the license has not been rejected. Courts have often required sales to be subject to existing licenses.
  • Sale orders nonetheless frequently contain broad free-and-clear language, and a licensee that does not object may find its rights impaired as a practical matter.
  • Section 363(e) permits a court to condition a sale to provide adequate protection of an interest.

Practical instruction: if you receive a § 363 sale notice in a licensor's case, object or negotiate before the sale hearing. Ask that the sale order expressly provide that it is subject to your license, or that the purchaser assume it. Sale orders are final orders and are hard to unwind, and the doctrine of equitable mootness makes appeals difficult once a sale closes.

Part VI: Drafting and diligence

Everything above is what happens when the licensor files. The following is how to make that outcome survivable, and it is all done years earlier.

Structure the license to be non-executory where possible

  • Fully paid-up. A one-time payment rather than running royalties removes the licensee's most material continuing obligation.
  • Perpetual and irrevocable, expressly stated.
  • Minimize licensee obligations. Every continuing duty (reporting, minimum purchases, marking, audit cooperation) is an argument that the contract is executory.
  • Where continuing obligations are unavoidable, sever them: put the license grant in one agreement and the services, support, and reporting obligations in a separate one, and state that the license survives termination of the services agreement. Exide and Interstate Bakeries show that courts will look at whether agreements are integrated, so the separation must be real, not cosmetic.

Escrow

  • Source code and technical materials escrow with a reputable agent, with release conditions including insolvency, rejection, and failure to support.
  • Verify the deposit. An escrow of an unbuildable archive is worthless. Pay for build verification.
  • Update on a schedule, and make deposit an obligation with a remedy.
  • Include everything needed to actually use the material: build instructions, dependencies, keys, documentation, third-party component list, and named technical contacts.
  • Section 365(n)(3)(B) makes the escrow enforceable, and § 365(n)(4)(B) prevents the trustee from interfering with the escrow agent's obligations. Cite them in the escrow agreement.

Security interests

  • Take a security interest in the licensed IP, perfected by a UCC-1 filing and, for patents and trademarks, a recordation with the USPTO (for copyrights, recordation with the Copyright Office is the perfection mechanism).
  • A perfected secured creditor has materially better standing than a general unsecured creditor.
  • Coordinate with any existing lender's intercreditor arrangements; a lender with a blanket lien will not simply agree.

Springing and backup licenses

  • A springing license that becomes effective on defined events (insolvency, rejection, failure to support) is a common structure. Its enforceability against the estate depends on whether it is characterized as an ipso facto provision under § 365(e)(1), so it should be drafted as a presently granted license with a delayed exercise condition rather than as a future grant triggered by bankruptcy.
  • Consider a grant-back or standby license from the licensor's parent or from a co-owner where the structure permits.

Consents and assignment

  • Secure advance consent to assignment to your affiliates and successors, so a change in your own structure does not create a problem.
  • Consider whether to withhold consent to assignment by the licensor as leverage; § 365(c) makes your consent necessary in many cases.
  • Address what happens on a change of control of the licensor.

Trademark-specific

  • Include an express quality control mechanism the licensee can self-administer if the licensor stops functioning, addressing the naked licensing risk Mission Product left open.
  • Escrow brand standards, artwork, and specifications.
  • Consider a conditional assignment of the marks, recorded, triggered by defined events.

Diligence before you sign

  • Financial condition of the licensor: audited financials if available, and updated periodically for critical licensors.
  • Chain of title to the licensed IP, including recorded assignments and any prior licenses or liens. See Recording a Trademark Assignment.
  • Existing security interests in the IP (UCC searches plus USPTO and Copyright Office searches).
  • Concentration risk: if a single licensor's insolvency would end your business, price that risk or build an alternative.

If the licensor files

  1. Get on the service list and monitor the docket, including the first-day motions.
  2. Confirm the license is scheduled correctly; if it is not listed, file a proof of claim and object.
  3. Do not stop paying royalties without advice; nonpayment gives the debtor a termination argument.
  4. Preserve the § 365(n) election and make it timely in writing when rejection occurs.
  5. Demand the IP and enforce the escrow under § 365(n)(3).
  6. Object to any § 363 sale that does not carve out your license.
  7. Watch for assumption and assignment motions and assert § 365(c) if applicable law protects you.
  8. File a proof of claim for prepetition damages even if you elect retention, to preserve any claim not waived.
  9. Consider buying the IP, or joining a group of licensees to do so. Licensees are frequently the natural buyers of the assets they depend on.

Part V-A: The licensee's own bankruptcy, and cross-border cases

Most of this article addresses the licensor's insolvency. Two adjacent situations deserve their own treatment.

When the licensee files

A debtor-licensee that wants to keep operating must assume its licenses, and assumption has three statutory conditions under § 365(b)(1): cure of existing defaults, compensation for actual pecuniary loss, and adequate assurance of future performance.

Three problems recur:

1. The § 365(c) trap. As discussed above, in circuits applying the hypothetical test, a debtor-licensee may be barred from assuming a nonexclusive patent, copyright, or trademark license at all, because applicable non-bankruptcy law would bar assignment to a hypothetical third party. That result is counterintuitive and can be devastating: a software company reorganizing around technology it in-licensed may be unable to keep the licenses that make it viable. Practical responses include obtaining licensor consent (which the licensor may sell dearly), venue considerations, and negotiating advance consents into licenses before distress.

2. Cure amounts. Unpaid royalties, unreported usage discovered in an audit, and accrued minimum commitments all become cure obligations payable in full and in cash at assumption, ahead of general unsecured creditors. A licensee planning a filing should reconcile royalty accounts early, because a surprise cure number can defeat a plan.

3. Adequate assurance. For a license with ongoing support, quality control, or minimum purchase obligations, the licensor may demand real evidence that the reorganized entity can perform. Financial projections and exit financing commitments are the usual currency.

Assignment in a sale. A debtor-licensee selling its business will want to assign its licenses to the buyer. Section 365(f) generally overrides anti-assignment clauses, but § 365(c) is an exception, and IP licenses fall within it. The licensor's consent therefore becomes a gating item in the sale, and licensors should recognize the leverage.

Cross-border insolvency

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code implements the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. A foreign representative may seek recognition of a foreign main or non-main proceeding, which triggers the automatic stay as to assets in the United States and permits additional relief.

Two points matter for licensees:

  • Section 1522 conditions discretionary relief on the sufficient protection of the interests of creditors and other interested entities, which is the hook for a licensee arguing that its rights should be preserved.
  • Section 1506 permits a court to refuse relief manifestly contrary to United States public policy. Courts have used it sparingly, and licensees have argued, with mixed success, that stripping § 365(n)-style protections available under United States law would qualify.

The planning implication for global licenses: specify governing law and forum, consider parallel license grants from an entity in a favorable jurisdiction, and confirm whether the licensor's home jurisdiction has an analogue to § 365(n). Several do not, and a foreign administrator may have broader power to disclaim contracts than an American trustee does.

A worked example

Kestrel Diagnostics, Inc. (fictional) licenses two things from Aurora BioSystems, LLC (fictional): an exclusive patent license covering an assay method, and a trademark license for the AURORA-branded reagent line it resells. The license is a single agreement with running royalties, minimum annual purchases, quarterly reporting, and Aurora's obligation to provide technical support and to maintain the patents.

Aurora files Chapter 11 and moves to reject.

Is the agreement executory? Almost certainly yes. Kestrel has continuing royalty, purchase, and reporting obligations; Aurora has support and maintenance obligations.

Rejection is a breach. Under Mission Product, it does not rescind. Kestrel's rights conveyed by the contract survive.

The patent license. Kestrel elects under § 365(n)(1)(B) to retain its rights, including exclusivity, for the balance of the term. It must continue paying royalties, waives setoff, and waives administrative claims. It does not get Aurora's continued support or patent maintenance, which means Kestrel must now consider whether it can and should pay the maintenance fees itself or negotiate for an assignment. Section 365(n)(3) entitles Kestrel to demand the IP in Aurora's possession, which here means the assay protocols, validation data, and know-how, and to enforce its escrow.

The trademark license. Section 365(n) does not apply. Mission Product means rejection did not terminate it. Kestrel may keep using AURORA under the contract's terms, and should keep paying. The unresolved quality control question is Aurora's estate's problem, not Kestrel's, and Kestrel should point that out in negotiation: continued unsupervised use erodes the mark's value to any buyer, which gives Kestrel leverage to negotiate an assignment of the mark or a formal consent arrangement.

The sale. Aurora's plan contemplates a § 363 sale of the patent portfolio to a competitor. Kestrel must object unless the sale order provides that the sale is subject to Kestrel's license. If the buyer wants the patents free of Kestrel's exclusivity, it will have to buy Kestrel out, which is the negotiation Kestrel wants.

The § 365(c) angle. If Aurora instead seeks to assume and assign the license to the buyer, Kestrel can withhold consent, because patent and trademark licenses are not assignable under applicable non-bankruptcy law without consent. That is significant leverage and should be used deliberately.

What Kestrel should have done at signing. Split the agreement: a fully paid-up, perpetual, exclusive patent license in one document; a trademark license with self-administered quality standards in a second; and support, supply, and reporting obligations in a third that expressly does not condition the licenses. Escrow the protocols and validation data with verification. Take a perfected security interest in the licensed patents. Secure advance consent to assignment to Kestrel's affiliates. Total incremental cost at signing: perhaps $15,000 in legal fees. Value in the bankruptcy: the entire business.

Frequently asked questions

If my licensor goes bankrupt, do I lose my license? Not automatically. Rejection is a breach, not a rescission, so your rights survive. For patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and mask works, § 365(n) gives you an explicit election to retain them. For trademarks, Mission Product protects you.

Do I have to keep paying royalties after rejection? If you elect to retain under § 365(n), yes, for the duration of the contract, and you waive setoff and administrative claims. For trademarks, the mechanics are less defined, but expect to keep performing to keep the benefit.

Will the debtor keep supporting the product? No. Section 365(n) preserves your rights in the IP; it does not compel specific performance of support, maintenance, updates, or development. This is why escrow matters.

What is an ipso facto clause and does mine work? A provision terminating the contract on the counterparty's bankruptcy or insolvency. Section 365(e)(1) generally makes them unenforceable in bankruptcy, so do not rely on one.

Can the debtor sell the IP out from under me? It can try. Object to any § 363 sale that is not expressly subject to your license, and do it before the sale hearing. Sale orders are difficult to unwind afterward.

Can the debtor assign my license to a competitor? Generally not without your consent, because patent, copyright, and trademark licenses are non-assignable under applicable non-bankruptcy law. That is your leverage. Note that the same rule may prevent a debtor-licensee from assuming its own licenses in hypothetical-test circuits.

What if I am the licensee and I file for bankruptcy? Then the § 365(c) hypothetical test is your problem. In several circuits you may be unable to assume in-licensed IP without the licensor's consent, which can be fatal to a reorganization. Plan for it, and consider negotiating advance consents in the license.

Does § 365(n) cover foreign IP? The definition in § 101(35A) refers to categories, and the statute has been applied to foreign patents in some cases. Analyze this in advance for global portfolios, and consider parallel foreign law protections.

Does § 365(n) cover know-how and trade secrets? Yes, trade secrets are expressly listed. Make sure the license grants rights in the know-how and that the know-how is actually deliverable, ideally through escrow.

Should I file a proof of claim if I elect to retain? Yes, to preserve any prepetition damages claim not waived by the election, and to be sure you are treated as a creditor for notice and voting purposes. Deadlines are strict.

Closing thought

Mission Product was the right answer to a question that should not have been so hard. Rejection is a breach, and a breach does not undo what a contract already gave you. The Court's landlord analogy is the version to remember: the landlord's breach does not put the tenant on the street.

But the decision solved one problem and left the ones that actually destroy businesses. Section 365(n) preserves your rights while stripping the licensor's obligations, which means a licensee whose product depends on ongoing engineering support keeps a license to something it can no longer maintain. Section 365(c) can prevent the license from moving to a buyer who would support it, or prevent a debtor-licensee from keeping licenses it needs. And a § 363 sale order, entered on shortened notice while everyone is arguing about financing, can impair rights that no one intended to impair.

The protection that works is structural and it is cheap at signing: a paid-up perpetual grant, separated from the services, escrowed with verification, secured by a perfected lien, with consents in hand.

The protection that does not work is a clause saying the license terminates if the licensor goes bankrupt. That clause is unenforceable, it is in thousands of agreements, and it gives its drafters a false sense that the problem was addressed.

Related articles

This article is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Bankruptcy outcomes depend on circuit law, the specific contract, and the posture of the case. Consult qualified bankruptcy and IP counsel promptly if a licensor or licensee becomes insolvent.