Document type: Checklist Practice area: Corporate — Antitrust Jurisdiction: United States (federal) Last reviewed: 5 September 2026


Part 1 — Diligence: map the overlaps

  • Overlap matrix built at the product and geography level, not the corporate level. (Section 7 reaches harm in any line of commerce in any section of the country.)
  • For each cell: both parties' revenue, estimated shares, and the other significant competitors.
  • Closest-competitor question answered from data: who does each party actually lose deals to, and in what order? (Win-loss records, bid data, sales force reporting — better evidence than published shares.)
  • Non-horizontal theories screened:
    • Does either party supply the other's competitors? (Foreclosure / raising rivals' costs)
    • Would the combination give access to rivals' competitively sensitive information?
    • Is the target a recent entrant or nascent competitor? (Potential competition)
    • Is this the latest of a series that would be assessed cumulatively?
  • Margins and diversion estimated for each material overlap.
  • Honest assessment delivered — including, where warranted, that the deal has a real problem.

Part 2 — Diligence: the document assessment

  • Likely custodians searched for the predictable themes: the target as the principal competitive constraint; pricing effects in the deal model; consolidation, discipline, or ability to raise price; short competitor lists.
  • Understood: 16 C.F.R. Part 803 requires production of specified transaction-analysis documents with the initial filing, before any second request.
  • For each problem document: who wrote it, what role they had, what they meant, and what context exists.
  • Explanation built BEFORE filing, not after production.
  • Nothing deleted or altered. Preservation instituted early, broadly, and verifiably.
  • No memorandum written explaining that a bad email did not mean what it says — it is produced too.

Part 3 — Allocate the risk in the agreement

  • Efforts covenant set by the Part 1–2 findings, not by precedent: commercially reasonable / reasonable best / hell or high water — or a divestiture obligation capped by reference to a stated revenue amount.
  • Obligation to litigate, and whether it is capped.
  • Outside date, with defined automatic extensions and a limit on the number.
  • Reverse termination fee sized to the seller's disruption — where the risk is actually allocated.
  • Interim operating covenants drafted to preserve the business without creating buyer control (see Part 8), with materiality thresholds and a twelve-month horizon in mind.
  • Process control: who leads, who attends agency meetings, who approves submissions, seller's information and consultation rights.
  • Seller's cooperation obligations specified — data and witnesses are a real burden.
  • Closing condition: waiting period expiration, and whether absence of a pending challenge is a condition.
  • Rationale for each term written down at signing, because the deal team will change.

Part 4 — Reportability and filing

  • Reportability run in writing under 15 U.S.C. § 18a and 16 C.F.R. Part 801; re-run on any structure change.
  • Aggregation of previously held voting securities considered.
  • Ultimate parent entity correctly identified (funds, family holdings, management vehicles require analysis).
  • Exemptions assessed carefully — including the investment-only exemption, which does not survive board representation or intent to influence management.
  • Filing fee allocation agreed.
  • Understood: reportability and legality are different questions. Non-reportable and consummated transactions are challenged.
  • Part 803 document production prepared with the Part 2 context ready.
  • Agency clearance anticipated (FTC vs. Antitrust Division — procedures, remedy practice, and litigation posture differ).
  • Voluntary staff meeting during the initial period — business and market presented, with data.
  • Pull-and-refile agreed if requested — the alternative the agency is contemplating is a second request. Use the extra 30 days to persuade.

Part 5 — Second request: negotiate the scope in three weeks

This sets the entire budget and timeline.

  • Custodian count negotiated down, with a documented explanation of each person's actual role. (A 40-name list is an opening position.)
  • Date range narrowed category by category.
  • Data specifications negotiated in format, granularity, and period — these require finance and IT more than lawyers.
  • Protocol agreed in writing before review begins: search terms or TAR methodology with validation, de-duplication and threading, family production rules, privilege log format, rolling schedule, foreign-language and legacy data treatment.
  • Review staffed as litigation: review team, project manager, e-discovery vendor, company personnel committed in writing.
  • Narrative specifications drafted like pleadings — they become admissions.
  • Budget presented to the board with the drivers named, in month two.

Part 6 — The substantive campaign, in parallel

  • Economist retained early — the analysis needs the same data and takes months.
  • Diversion ratios and margins developed from win-loss, bid, and switching data.
  • Entry and expansion evidence: timely, likely, and sufficient.
  • Efficiencies tested before submission: merger-specific, verifiable, passed through. (Board synergy models are usually inadequate; a rejected claim damages credibility.)
  • Customer outreach conducted carefully — understand what customers will say, with no coaching or pressure, and document the process.
  • Rebuttal evidence assembled in the United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) mold, where shares misstate future competitive significance.
  • Staff asked what concerns them — and the campaign aimed at that theory.
  • Repeated staff meetings held during compliance, not after.
  • Signals read: narrowing follow-ups, interest in third-party costs, requests for a specific customer's contracts.
  • Any inaccurate submission corrected promptly and in writing.

Part 7 — Certification and timing agreement

  • Certification timing confirmed with staff first. Too early invites a compliance dispute that stops the clock; too late slips the deal.
  • Understood: certification restarts 30 days (10 for cash tender offers) under § 18a(e).
  • Timing agreement negotiated: length of the post-certification period (commonly 60–90 days); number and timing of substantive meetings; front office access, not only line staff; commitments on economic and data submissions; notice period before closing.
  • Rationale understood: an agency that has not finished when the clock expires sues to preserve the status quo.
  • Board told the deal is now on a months-long schedule; outside date checked against it.

Part 8 — Gun jumping controls

Until the waiting period ends the parties remain independent competitors§ 18a and potentially Sherman Act § 1.

  • Clean team protocol written before any information moves: membership (outside advisors plus employees without commercial responsibility for the affected products), scope, outputs, and no reporting of underlying data back into the business.
  • Does not move between the parties: current pricing, customer-specific terms, bid information, forward commercial plans, cost data at pricing granularity.
  • Buyer does not: approve or direct the target's pricing, bids, or customer terms; attend customer meetings as one company; allocate customers or territories "for after closing"; integrate sales forces; transfer employees.
  • Interim covenants reviewed by antitrust counsel — a consent right over ordinary-course pricing is a control right.
  • Business teams trained; single point of contact who can answer "can we do this" within an hour.
  • Exposure understood: per-day civil penalties, an independent Sherman Act claim, and evidence handed to the agency that the parties already act as one firm.

Part 9 — Remedy design

  • Brought early, before the agency commits to a challenge.
  • Structural relief proposed — divestiture restores an independent competitor without ongoing supervision.
  • Package designed as a standalone business: manufacturing, intellectual property and know-how, regulatory registrations, customer contracts, supply arrangements, and the people.
  • Upfront buyer identified and approvable: financially capable, experienced, independent, with incentive and ability to compete.
  • Transitional support negotiated tightly — short terms, arm's-length pricing, clean exits.
  • Crown jewel provision anticipated.
  • Behavioral remedies recognized as a hard sell for horizontal overlaps; used mainly in vertical matters.
  • Decree machinery understood: DOJ consent judgment with public comment and judicial review; FTC consent order with comment period. Monitoring, reporting, and compliance obligations outlast the deal team — owner assigned.

Part 10 — If there is no remedy

  • Posture understood: DOJ sues in district court under 15 U.S.C. § 25; FTC typically seeks a preliminary injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) with a parallel administrative proceeding.
  • Recognized: the preliminary injunction stage is effectively final — financing, employees, and customers do not survive the delay.
  • Prepared for a fast, expert-heavy trial on ordinary-course documents, executive testimony, customer testimony, and competing economic models.
  • Burden framework understood: government's prima facie case → defendants rebut → ultimate burden remains with the government.
  • Litigating the fix considered, recognizing that whether the court evaluates the deal with or without the proposed remedy is contested.
  • Decision made as a business decision, per the efforts covenant and reverse termination fee in Part 3.

Part 11 — The other regulators

  • One regulatory calendar built at signing: every filing, its trigger, timeline, whether it is suspensory, and its owner.
  • State attorneys general — independent authority, increasingly active; brief them deliberately.
  • Foreign merger control — a single suspensory jurisdiction sets the closing date. Submissions consistent across jurisdictions; they are compared.
  • Foreign investment review where the buyer has foreign ownership or the target holds critical technology, sensitive data, or covered real estate.
  • Sector regulators — communications, energy, banking, insurance, transportation, healthcare, defense — several applying a broader public interest standard.
  • Outside date checked against all of it.

Part 12 — Witnesses and the business team

  • Investigational hearing witnesses prepared with documents, not themes.
  • Three habits taught: answer the question asked; say "I don't recall" when true; do not speculate about a document you did not write.
  • No scripting — coached answers are obvious and taint everything else.
  • Sales and commercial teams prepared separately: how deals are won, who they compete against, what happens when a customer threatens to switch. Casual overstatement identified and corrected.
  • Customer contact rule circulated in writing: do not discuss the investigation with customers, do not suggest what to say, report any customer who mentions being contacted.
  • Executives who will meet staff rehearsed on substance.

Part 13 — Running the business during review

  • Employee attrition anticipated and addressed — retention arrangements, honest communication, and clarity that the buyer cannot commit on roles before closing.
  • Customers managed: target continues selling normally; no joint presentation; commercial teams given a script and a boundary.
  • Interim covenants checked for operational paralysis over a twelve-month horizon.
  • Financing commitment outside dates and market flex reviewed.
  • Seller's optionality cost recognized — what the reverse termination fee compensates.
  • Public company mechanics: proxy timing, re-run votes, disclosure of review status.
  • Rationale for the merger agreement's antitrust terms written down, because the deal team will change.

Part 14 — Divestiture execution and decree compliance

  • A business carved out, not a set of assets — including the technical staff who actually make the product.
  • Dedicated divestiture team, separate from the integration team.
  • Hold-separate obligations honored: independent management, continued investment, no poaching of the divested business's customers or staff.
  • Buyer approval process managed; agency diligence on financing, experience, independence, and genuine intent to compete anticipated.
  • Transitional arrangements kept short and clean — they become long-term relationships with a competitor you created.
  • Crown jewel trigger date treated as real.
  • Post-closing decree obligations owned by a named person with authority: divestiture deadlines, monitoring, reporting, certifications, monitor or trustee.
  • Waiting period expiration or decree entry confirmed before closing; advance-notice commitment honored.
  • Post-matter debrief written: what it cost, what drove the cost, which documents caused problems, what to do differently next time.

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This checklist is general information, not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship.