CAFA Jurisdiction and Class Action Removal: Amount in Controversy, Exceptions, and Mass Actions

Document type: Article Practice area: Litigation — Class Actions Jurisdiction: United States (federal) Last reviewed: 5 September 2026

What CAFA changed

Before 2005, a class action was hard to remove. Complete diversity was required, which meant a single in-state defendant or a single in-state class member defeated it. The amount in controversy had to be satisfied by each class member individually under the then-prevailing understanding. Plaintiffs' counsel drafted around federal jurisdiction routinely and successfully.

The Class Action Fairness Act changed three things at once, and understanding all three is what makes the statute make sense.

It substituted minimal diversity for complete diversity. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), district courts have original jurisdiction over a class action where the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant — or where a class member or defendant is a foreign state or citizen thereof in the specified configurations. One diverse pair suffices.

It permitted aggregation. Section 1332(d)(6) provides that in determining whether the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated. The individual-claim threshold that used to defeat consumer class actions disappeared for CAFA purposes.

It rewrote the removal rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) provides that a class action may be removed without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought — no forum defendant rule — and that it may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants. Section 1453(b) also removes the one-year outer limit on diversity removals that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) imposes in ordinary diversity cases.

The practical effect is that the great majority of consumer, wage, and product class actions filed in state court are removable, and the litigation moves to whether an exception applies and whether the removal was executed properly.

Beaumont Hearth & Home

Beaumont Hearth & Home is a 4,000-employee retailer of fireplaces, stoves, and outdoor heating products, incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters and executive offices in Charlotte. It operates 210 stores in 22 states, including 34 in California.

In February a putative class action was filed in California Superior Court alleging that Beaumont's advertised "compare at" prices were fictitious, on behalf of "all California purchasers" over a four-year period. The complaint pleaded state consumer protection claims, sought restitution and injunctive relief, and — carefully — alleged that "the aggregate amount in controversy does not exceed $5,000,000," while pleading no damages figure at all.

Priya Vaneshwaran-Ochoa, Beaumont's general counsel, had thirty days. What follows is what she and her outside counsel worked through, and it is the ordinary sequence.

Threshold: is this a "class action" under CAFA?

Section 1332(d)(1)(B) defines "class action" as any civil action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by one or more representative persons as a class action.

That definition is broad and catches state-law analogues. It has also produced genuine litigation at the edges — representative actions brought under statutes that authorize a plaintiff to sue on behalf of others without the machinery of class certification are not always "class actions" for CAFA purposes, and the answer depends on how closely the state procedure resembles Rule 23. Check the characterization before assuming.

Then check the numerosity floor. Under § 1332(d)(5)(B), CAFA jurisdiction does not apply where the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is fewer than 100. This is a real limit on small representative actions and it is jurisdictional.

And check the defendant. Under § 1332(d)(5)(A), CAFA does not apply where the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief.

The amount in controversy, and what Dart Cherokee settled

This is where most CAFA fights live, and two Supreme Court decisions define the landscape.

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) held that a notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Evidence establishing the amount is required only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation. The Court grounded this in the text of § 1446(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal," language deliberately tracking the pleading standard of Rule 8(a). The Court also rejected the notion of a presumption against removal in CAFA cases, observing that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.

The practical consequence is that a defendant removing under CAFA should plead the amount in controversy plausibly in the notice and should not attach a mountain of evidence to it. Save the evidence for the opposition to the remand motion, where it becomes necessary and where the defendant has had time to assemble it properly. Loading the notice with declarations invites a fight over evidence the plaintiff has not yet contested.

When the amount is contested, both sides may submit proof and the district court decides by a preponderance of the evidence whether the threshold is satisfied. The evidence is typically a declaration from someone with knowledge of the relevant business records — transaction counts, revenue, class period, and the arithmetic connecting them to the claims pleaded.

Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013) closed the most obvious workaround. A named plaintiff stipulated that he and the class would not seek damages exceeding $5,000,000. The Court held unanimously that the stipulation did not defeat CAFA jurisdiction, because a named plaintiff cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. The stipulation was therefore not binding and did not reduce the value of the claims.

The lesson for both sides. A plaintiff cannot plead around the threshold by disclaiming damages on behalf of absent class members. A defendant should not treat such a disclaimer as an obstacle — but should also recognize that a plaintiff who genuinely pleads a narrow class over a short period, seeking a specific limited remedy, may simply have a case worth less than $5,000,000.

How the amount is computed. Aggregate the claims of all class members under § 1332(d)(6). Include compensatory damages, statutory damages, restitution, and — where recoverable under the substantive law — punitive damages and attorneys' fees. The value of injunctive relief counts, measured by a standard that varies among circuits. Interest and costs are excluded by the statute's terms.

For Beaumont, the arithmetic was straightforward once the data was pulled: California transactions during the class period involving products with a "compare at" price totaled roughly $71 million in revenue. Even a restitution theory recovering a fraction of the price differential cleared $5,000,000 comfortably, and the statutory damages theory cleared it by an order of magnitude.

The exceptions, and who has to prove them

CAFA jurisdiction is established by the removing defendant. The exceptions are affirmative, and the party seeking remand — the plaintiff — bears the burden of establishing them. That allocation is the single most consequential procedural fact about the exceptions, and it decides a great many motions.

The local controversy exception (mandatory)

Under § 1332(d)(4)(A), the district court shall decline jurisdiction where:

Greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed;
At least one defendant is a defendant from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class, whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted, and who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed;
Principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and
During the 3-year period preceding the filing, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.

Four elements, all required, all litigated. The two-thirds citizenship showing is the hardest, because citizenship is not residence — it requires domicile, meaning presence plus intent to remain — and a class defined by purchase location or shipping address is not a class defined by citizenship. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to satisfy this element by inference from the class definition, and courts differ on how much inference is permissible. Survey evidence and statistical proof appear in the better-litigated cases.

The "significant basis" element requires more than naming a local defendant. The local defendant's alleged conduct must form a significant basis for the claims of the class as a whole, assessed against the conduct of all defendants collectively.

The three-year prior-filing element rewards a defendant who tracks the filings against it.

The home state exception (mandatory)

Under § 1332(d)(4)(B), the court shall decline jurisdiction where two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.

Simpler than the local controversy exception and narrower. Note the "primary defendants" language — a case with a primary defendant from another State does not qualify, and identifying who the primary defendants are is itself contested where there are several.

The discretionary exception

Under § 1332(d)(3), where greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the filing State, the district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline jurisdiction based on six factors: whether the claims involve matters of national or interstate interest; whether the claims will be governed by the law of the filing State or by the laws of other States; whether the pleading has been drafted to avoid federal jurisdiction; whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus to the class, the alleged harm, or the defendants; whether the number of citizens of the filing State is substantially larger than that of any other State and the citizenship of the rest is dispersed; and whether during the preceding 3-year period one or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims have been filed.

Discretionary exception motions succeed less often than the mandatory ones, and the third factor — pleading drafted to avoid federal jurisdiction — cuts against the plaintiff who invokes it.

The carve-outs

Section 1332(d)(9) removes from CAFA's reach class actions solely involving claims: concerning a covered security as defined in the securities laws; that relate to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other form of business enterprise and that arise under or by virtue of the laws of the State of incorporation or organization; or that relate to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any security as defined in the Securities Act of 1933.

These carve-outs matter enormously in Delaware. Fiduciary duty class actions arising under Delaware corporate law are outside CAFA, which is why merger litigation stays in the Court of Chancery. The word "solely" does the work: a complaint that pairs a governance claim with a claim outside the carve-out may be removable in its entirety, and plaintiffs draft carefully around that.

Mass actions

CAFA reaches beyond class actions to a category Congress invented for the statute.

Section 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) defines a "mass action" as a civil action in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact — except that jurisdiction exists only over those plaintiffs whose claims individually satisfy the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement.

The exclusions are as important as the definition. Under § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii), a mass action does not include an action in which: all of the claims arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or contiguous States; the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; all of the claims are asserted on behalf of the general public pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such an action; or the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.

Two practical consequences. First, the "proposed to be tried jointly" requirement means that plaintiffs can avoid mass action treatment by filing multiple actions of fewer than 100 plaintiffs each, or by seeking coordination for pretrial purposes only. Plaintiffs' counsel structure filings around this deliberately, and courts have addressed the point at which a proposal for coordination becomes a proposal for joint trial.

Second, § 1332(d)(11)(C) provides that a mass action removed to federal court may not thereafter be transferred to any other court pursuant to the multidistrict litigation statute unless a majority of the plaintiffs request it — a provision that materially affects the strategic calculus in mass tort filings.

Who may remove, after Home Depot

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435 (2019) addressed a recurring structure: a debt collection action filed by a creditor against a consumer, in which the consumer files a class counterclaim against the creditor and joins a third party as an additional counterclaim defendant. May that third-party counterclaim defendant remove?

The Court held no. The term "defendant" in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) refers to the party sued by the original plaintiff, and a third-party counterclaim defendant is not a "defendant" who may remove. The Court further held that § 1453(b) does not alter that result: the provision's references to "any defendant" address the unanimity and forum-defendant limitations, not the threshold question of who qualifies as a defendant at all.

The practical effect is that a company brought into a state court action as a counterclaim defendant in a putative class counterclaim cannot remove, however clearly the counterclaim satisfies CAFA's substantive requirements. Plaintiffs' counsel have used that structure deliberately since the decision.

Procedure, timing, and the trap in the second removal window

Timing. Section 1446(b)(1) requires the notice of removal within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading. Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) established that the clock is triggered by formal service of process, not by receipt of a courtesy copy — a defendant served after receiving an unserved copy gets the full period from service.

The second window. Section 1446(b)(3) provides that where the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice may be filed within 30 days after receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. In CAFA practice this is the provision that saves a defendant whose initial assessment was that the case fell below $5,000,000, and which discovery or an amended pleading later shows otherwise. Watch for the "other paper" — a discovery response, a demand letter, a mediation statement — and calendar 30 days from it.

The one-year limit does not apply. Section 1453(b) expressly excepts CAFA removals from § 1446(c)(1), which otherwise bars diversity removal more than one year after commencement.

Remand motions. Section 1447(c) requires a motion to remand on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time, and the court must remand if at any time before final judgment it appears the court lacks jurisdiction.

Appellate review, which CAFA changed. Section 1447(d) generally makes an order remanding a case not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, subject to exceptions. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) confirmed the breadth of that bar for remands based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, while Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) held that a remand of supplemental state claims after the district court declines supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is not a § 1447(c) remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore reviewable. And BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230 (2021) held that where an order is reviewable under the exception in § 1447(d) because removal was premised in part on the federal officer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443, the court of appeals may review the entire remand order, not merely the § 1442 or § 1443 ground.

CAFA's own review provision is § 1453(c), and it is unusual: a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order granting or denying remand in a CAFA class action if application is made not more than 10 days after entry of the order. Review is discretionary; the deadline is not. Where the court of appeals accepts the appeal, it must generally complete all action within 60 days, subject to extension.

Diarize the ten days on the day the order issues. It is the shortest meaningful deadline in class action practice and it is missed regularly.

The mechanics of getting it right

CAFA removals fail on execution more often than on doctrine. A short list of the errors that produce avoidable remands.

Filing in the wrong district. Section 1441(a) requires removal to the district and division embracing the place where the state action is pending. Not the district where the defendant is headquartered, and not the district where counsel practices.

Missing a paper. Section 1446(a) requires the notice to include a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon the removing defendant. An incomplete attachment set is a procedural defect, and while it is usually curable, it is an unnecessary fight.

Failing to give notice. Section 1446(d) requires the removing defendant to give written notice to all adverse parties and to file a copy of the notice with the clerk of the state court, which effects the removal and stops state court proceedings. Defendants forget the state court filing regularly, and until it is made the state court may continue to act.

Getting citizenship wrong. Allege the citizenship of every party properly: State of incorporation and principal place of business for corporations; the citizenship of every member for unincorporated entities, traced through every tier of a multi-tier limited liability company. A notice alleging that an LLC is "a citizen of Delaware" because it was formed there states no jurisdictional fact at all.

Overloading the notice. After Dart Cherokee, a short and plain statement suffices, and evidence belongs in the opposition to remand. A notice with three declarations invites an evidentiary fight before the plaintiff has raised one.

Missing the second window. Section 1446(b)(3) starts a new 30 days on receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which removability may first be ascertained. Discovery responses, demand letters, and mediation statements all qualify. Diarize from the paper.

Missing the ten-day appellate application. Section 1453(c) permits a court of appeals to accept an appeal from a remand order if application is made not more than 10 days after entry. It is the shortest meaningful deadline in class action practice. Calendar it the day the order issues, before deciding whether to use it.

And on the plaintiff's side, missing the 30-day procedural window. Section 1447(c) waives every defect other than subject matter jurisdiction if not raised within 30 days of the notice of removal. A procedurally defective removal left unchallenged becomes a valid one.

Federal question and ordinary diversity, which are still available

CAFA is not the only route, and a defendant should check the alternatives before relying on it — particularly where the amount in controversy is genuinely uncertain or an exception may apply.

Federal question removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and § 1331 follows the well-pleaded complaint rule: the federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, and a federal defense does not create jurisdiction. But a state-law claim can arise under federal law in the narrow category described in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), where a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) applied that framework to a legal malpractice claim turning on patent law and found the federal issue insufficiently substantial — a useful calibration of how narrow the category is.

Ordinary diversity removal under § 1332(a) requires complete diversity and more than $75,000 in controversy, and remains subject to the forum defendant rule in § 1441(b)(2), the unanimity requirement, and the one-year limit in § 1446(c) — all of which § 1453(b) sets aside for CAFA. For a class action it is rarely the better route, but it matters where CAFA's numerosity floor or an exception defeats the CAFA theory.

Corporate citizenship for diversity purposes is the State of incorporation and the State where the principal place of business is located, and Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) fixed the latter as the nerve center — the place where the corporation's high-level officers direct, control, and coordinate its activities, normally its headquarters. Unincorporated entities take the citizenship of their members, which for a multi-tier limited liability company means tracing through every layer.

Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 reaches claims forming part of the same case or controversy. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) held that where one plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same case who do not — subject to the complete diversity requirement. In a pre-CAFA world that was the principal aggregation question; today it matters mainly where CAFA is unavailable.

Other removal statutes worth checking in the right case: § 1442 for actions against federal officers and persons acting under them, which reaches government contractors more often than defendants realize; § 1443 for civil rights cases; § 1452 for claims related to a bankruptcy case; and § 1454 for patent, plant variety protection, and copyright cases, which uniquely permits removal by any party, including a counterclaim defendant.

And watch § 1359, which denies jurisdiction where a party has been improperly or collusively joined to invoke it — the mirror image of the fraudulent joinder doctrine defendants invoke to disregard a non-diverse defendant joined without a colorable claim against it.

What happens after the case stays in federal court

Winning removal is not the point; it is the beginning of a case that now runs on federal rules, and several consequences follow that are worth pricing into the decision.

Certification is decided under Rule 23, with the rigorous-analysis standard and the predominance inquiry that has produced a materially different body of law from many state analogues. For a defendant, this is usually the reason removal was worth doing.

Pleading is decided under the federal standard. A complaint drafted to satisfy a notice-pleading state standard may not survive a motion to dismiss in federal court, and the motion should be filed promptly.

Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the gatekeeping standard, which matters for the damages model that supports predominance.

Discovery runs on the federal rules, with proportionality, mandatory disclosures, and — significantly for class practice — the ability to seek a bifurcation between certification and merits discovery.

Settlement approval is governed by Rule 23(e), with the specified factors, the notice requirements, and the CAFA notice obligation to federal and state officials that applies to proposed class settlements. That last item has its own timing consequence: the court may not issue final approval earlier than the statutory period after the notices are served, and missing it delays approval.

Coordination changes. If parallel actions exist, the case is now eligible for transfer under the multidistrict litigation statute — except in a removed mass action, where § 1332(d)(11)(C) bars transfer unless a majority of plaintiffs request it.

And the remand risk does not fully close. Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time before final judgment under § 1447(c), and a class definition narrowed during the litigation can, in principle, put the jurisdictional facts back in issue — though the prevailing view is that CAFA jurisdiction is assessed at the time of removal and post-removal events generally do not divest it. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) supplies the related principle that a jurisdictional defect cured before judgment does not require vacatur, which counsels against assuming any later development is fatal.

The honest summary for a client: removal buys federal certification law, federal pleading and evidentiary standards, and a judge with a different docket. It costs the time and expense of the removal fight and, occasionally, a court of appeals detour under § 1453(c). For most defendants in most consumer class actions, that trade is worth making — but it should be made as a decision rather than a reflex.

Proving the amount: what the evidence actually looks like

When the plaintiff contests the amount in controversy, the case is decided on a declaration and a spreadsheet. Both sides should understand what a good one contains.

Start with the pleaded claims, not with revenue. The amount in controversy is what the complaint puts in issue, assuming liability. A defendant that submits gross revenue for a product line without connecting it to the theory pleaded has proved nothing except that it is a large company. Walk the arithmetic: this claim, this measure of recovery, this class definition, this period, this number of transactions, this result.

Identify the declarant properly. Someone with actual knowledge of the systems and the records — a finance or operations executive, not counsel. State the basis of knowledge, describe how the data was pulled, and attach or describe the query. A declaration that says "based on my review of company records, sales were approximately $X" without saying which records or how they were queried is vulnerable.

Be careful with assumptions, and label them. Most amount-in-controversy showings require assumptions: a violation rate, a per-transaction measure, a take-up rate. Assumptions must be reasonable and grounded in the allegations of the complaint — a defendant may generally assume a 100% violation rate where the complaint alleges a uniform practice, but not where the complaint alleges a practice that occurred sometimes. Courts have become notably less tolerant of unsupported assumptions, particularly in wage and hour cases, and a defendant relying on one should say what in the complaint supports it.

Include what the law allows and exclude what it does not. Statutory damages where the statute provides them. Restitution measured as the complaint measures it. Punitive damages where recoverable under the substantive law, at a ratio a court will accept. Attorneys' fees where the statute or contract provides for them — with the circuit split on whether future fees count, which is worth knowing before you brief it. Injunctive relief valued by the applicable standard, which varies among circuits between the value to the plaintiff, the cost to the defendant, and the value to either party. Exclude interest and costs, which § 1332(d)(2) excludes by its terms.

Anticipate the plaintiff's response. It will be that the assumptions are speculative, that the class definition is narrower than the data used, and that the measure of recovery is overstated. Address each in the declaration rather than in reply.

And from the plaintiff's side: the productive attack is on the connection between the data and the theory, not on the data. A defendant's transaction totals are usually accurate. Whether every one of those transactions gives rise to a claim under the theory pleaded is where the motion is won.

Strategy from the plaintiff's side

Plaintiffs' counsel who want a state forum have a small number of genuine tools and a larger number of tactics that do not work. Knowing which is which saves motion practice on both sides.

What does not work.

Disclaiming damages. Standard Fire forecloses a named plaintiff's stipulation capping class recovery, because the named plaintiff cannot bind absent members before certification. Pleading "damages do not exceed $5,000,000" without more accomplishes nothing except to invite the defendant's arithmetic.

Pleading no amount at all. Silence does not create an obstacle after Dart Cherokee; the defendant pleads plausibly and proves it if contested.

Suing only in-state defendants when the real defendant is not in-state. Minimal diversity under § 1332(d)(2) requires only one diverse pair anywhere in the case.

What can work.

Genuinely narrow the class. A class limited to a single State, a short period, and a specific product, seeking a specific limited remedy, may simply be worth less than $5,000,000. This is not a pleading device; it is a decision to bring a smaller case, with real consequences for fees and leverage.

Stay under 100 class members, which takes the case outside CAFA under § 1332(d)(5)(B). Rarely available in consumer cases; occasionally available in narrow commercial ones.

Build the local controversy exception into the case from the start. Name a genuine in-state defendant from whom significant relief is sought and whose conduct forms a significant basis for the claims — a local operating subsidiary, a franchisee, a distributor — and be prepared to prove it, not merely to plead it. Then define the class so that the two-thirds citizenship element is provable: citizenship, not residence, not purchase location. Where the record permits, be ready with declarations, survey evidence, or statistical proof of domicile.

Check the three-year prior-filing element before filing. A copycat complaint filed after a similar action elsewhere destroys the local controversy exception for everyone.

Use the securities and internal-affairs carve-outs deliberately. Section 1332(d)(9) keeps governance and fiduciary claims arising under the law of the State of incorporation out of CAFA — but only where the action solely involves such claims. Adding a consumer claim to a fiduciary duty complaint can remove the whole case from the Court of Chancery.

Structure mass filings deliberately. The mass action definition requires 100 or more persons proposed to be tried jointly. Multiple filings below the threshold, and coordination requested solely for pretrial proceedings, both sit outside § 1332(d)(11) — the latter expressly.

Consider the counterclaim structure. After Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435 (2019), a third-party counterclaim defendant cannot remove, whatever the substantive fit with CAFA.

And move to remand within 30 days on procedural grounds, per § 1447(c), because a procedural defect not raised in that window is waived — while a genuine absence of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.

How Beaumont's removal went

Vaneshwaran-Ochoa removed on day 26 after service, in the Central District of California.

The notice was short. Following Dart Cherokee, it pleaded the jurisdictional facts plausibly — a class of California purchasers over four years comprising well over 100 members, Beaumont's Delaware incorporation and North Carolina headquarters establishing minimal diversity against a California class, and an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 based on the pleaded claims and the size of the affected California business. It attached no declarations.

Plaintiffs moved to remand on two grounds: that the amount in controversy was not established, and that the local controversy exception applied.

On the amount, Beaumont submitted a declaration from its vice president of finance with transaction data: California sales of "compare at" products during the class period, the number of transactions, and the arithmetic connecting them to a restitution measure and to the statutory damages claim. The plaintiffs' stipulation-style allegation capping the claim at $5,000,000 was answered with Standard Fire. The court found the threshold satisfied by a preponderance.

On the local controversy exception, the plaintiffs' burden proved decisive. They could show that purchases occurred in California; they could not show that greater than two-thirds of class members were California citizens, because purchase location does not establish domicile and a meaningful share of Beaumont's California purchases were made by out-of-state visitors and second-home owners. They also could not satisfy the local defendant element, because the only defendant was Beaumont itself — a Delaware corporation headquartered in North Carolina, whose principal place of business under Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) is its nerve center in Charlotte.

Remand denied. Plaintiffs did not seek review under § 1453(c).

The lesson Vaneshwaran-Ochoa drew was about the naming of defendants: had the plaintiffs sued a California subsidiary or a California store-operating entity as well, the local controversy analysis would have been genuinely contested. Defendants should expect that structure in the next complaint, and plaintiffs should have used it in this one.