LitigationAntitrust Litigation
Antitrust for Technology Companies: Monopolization, Platform Conduct, and the IP-Antitrust Interface
Technology companies operate in markets with network effects, near-zero marginal costs, and winner-take-most dynamics, which produce high concentration through ordinary competitive success and also create powerful incentives to keep competitors out. Antitrust law is the body of doctrine that tries to distinguish between the two, and it has been unusually active in the technology sector for the first time since the Microsoft case. This article explains the framework a technology lawyer actually needs: the elements of monopolization and attempted monopolization under Section 2, why market definition decides most cases and why it is unusually hard for platforms after Ohio v. American Express, the specific conduct theories that recur in technology disputes including exclusive dealing, tying, self-preferencing, refusals to deal and interoperability, and predatory pricing, and the rule of reason framework that governs agreements under Section 1. It covers the major recent cases, the merger review regime and the 2023 guidelines, and the interface between intellectual property and antitrust, including standard essential patents and FRAND commitments, patent settlements after Actavis, licensing restrictions, and refusals to license. It closes with a compliance program, a worked example, an FAQ, and related reading.