The Copyright Claims Board: Small Claims Copyright Litigation Under the CASE Act

Summary. The Copyright Claims Board is a three-officer tribunal inside the U.S. Copyright Office that decides copyright disputes worth up to $30,000 without the cost of federal court, but only if the respondent does not opt out within 60 days of service. This article explains the CASE Act framework in 17 U.S.C. sections 1501 to 1511 and the Board's regulations: the claims the Board can hear, the damages caps, the registration rule, the opt-out, the smaller claims track, discovery and evidence, defaults, bad-faith penalties, and the narrow review available in district court. It analyzes the constitutional logic of a consent-based tribunal, the leading cases that shape Board practice, how the Board handles conflicting circuit law, and what a determination is worth once issued. It reviews what the Board's own statistics show about its first years, including how many claims fail compliance review, how many respondents opt out, and how few proceedings reach a contested determination. It closes with strategy for claimants and respondents, common mistakes, a worked example of a photographer's claim from filing through determination, an FAQ, and practical takeaways.

A wedding photographer finds her best bouquet shot on a florist's homepage two states away. The image licenses for about $500, and the federal copyright lawyer she calls wants a five-figure retainer before he will draft a complaint. Since June 2022 she has had a third option: a tribunal inside the U.S. Copyright Office where the filing fee is $100, everything happens online, and she can represent herself. The catch is that the florist can simply decline to play.

That tribunal is the Copyright Claims Board (the CCB, or the Board), created by the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020 (the CASE Act). This article explains how it works, why it was built the way it was, what the first years of operation show, and how claimants and respondents should think about it. Companion pieces in this series cover the step-by-step mechanics in Bringing or Defending a Claim Before the Copyright Claims Board: A Practical Guide, the deadlines in the Copyright Claims Board Filing and Opt-Out Checklist, and drafting forms in the Copyright Claims Board Toolkit.

The short answer

• What it is. A three-member tribunal housed in the Copyright Office that serves as "an alternative forum in which parties may voluntarily seek to resolve certain copyright claims." 17 U.S.C. § 1502(a). The whole statute is short: 17 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511.
• What it hears. Infringement claims, claims for a declaration of noninfringement, and DMCA misrepresentation claims under § 512(f), plus closely related counterclaims. 17 U.S.C. § 1504(c).
• What it can award. No more than $30,000 per proceeding. Statutory damages top out at $15,000 per work for a timely registered work and $7,500 per work (and $15,000 per proceeding) for a work that was not timely registered. The Board may not consider willfulness, cannot issue injunctions (though it will record an agreement to stop), and shifts fees only for bad-faith conduct. § 1504(e); 17 U.S.C. § 1506(y).
• It is voluntary. A properly served respondent has 60 days to opt out, and if it does the claim is dismissed without prejudice. § 1506(i). The claimant is then back where it started: federal court or nothing.
• Registration still matters, but less than in court. A claimant may file once the Copyright Office has received a complete application, but the Board cannot decide the case until a certificate issues. 17 U.S.C. § 1505.
• Review is narrow and the stakes stay small. After reconsideration and an optional review by the Register of Copyrights, a district court may vacate a determination only for fraud or misconduct, action beyond the Board's authority, or excusable neglect in a default. 17 U.S.C. § 1508(c). Determinations bind only the parties, only on the claims decided, and are not precedent. 17 U.S.C. § 1507.
• The numbers are sobering. Through March 2026, claimants filed 1,920 claims. More of them (787) were dismissed at the compliance-review stage than met any other fate, and only 47 ended in a final determination on the merits, 25 contested and 22 by default.

The legal framework: the CASE Act, chapter 15, and the Board's regulations

Why Congress built a copyright small claims tribunal

Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). That means no state small claims court can hear one, and an individual creator with a $1,000 grievance faces the same pleading rules, discovery obligations, and motion practice as a studio suing over a franchise. Registration rules make it worse: an owner of a United States work generally cannot sue until the Copyright Office has acted on a registration application, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), and cannot recover statutory damages or attorney's fees unless registration was timely, 17 U.S.C. § 412. For many photographers, illustrators, and independent writers, the result was a right without a remedy.

The Copyright Office studied the problem in its 2013 report, Copyright Small Claims, and recommended a voluntary tribunal inside the Office with capped damages, streamlined procedures, and limited review. Congress adopted most of that design in the CASE Act, enacted December 27, 2020, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. Q, tit. II, § 212, 134 Stat. 1182, 2176. The House Report explained that the Board was meant to be "accessible especially for pro se parties and those with little prior formal exposure to copyright laws who cannot otherwise afford to have their claims and defenses heard in federal court." H.R. Rep. No. 116-252, at 17 (2019). The Board began accepting claims on June 16, 2022.

Courts noticed. In Bell v. Wilmott Storage Services, LLC, 12 F.4th 1065 (9th Cir. 2021), the Ninth Circuit refused to excuse the display of an entire photograph on the theory that almost no one saw it, and it pointed to the new Board as the "cost-effective administrative venue" Congress had created for small claims of exactly that kind. The message for defendants was plain: a trivial-looking infringement is still an infringement, and there is now a cheap place to bring it.

The statute, section by section

Chapter 15 of title 17 is only eleven sections long. Every practitioner who handles a Board matter should read all of it, which takes about an hour.

The regulations

Section 1510 directed the Register of Copyrights to fill in the details, and the Office did so in a burst of rulemaking between 2021 and 2024. Notable final rules appear at 86 Fed. Reg. 46119 (Aug. 18, 2021) (expedited registration), 87 Fed. Reg. 13171 (Mar. 9, 2022) (opt-out procedures), 87 Fed. Reg. 16989 (Mar. 25, 2022) (initiating proceedings), 87 Fed. Reg. 20707 (Apr. 8, 2022) (representation), 87 Fed. Reg. 30060 (May 17, 2022) (active proceedings and evidence), 88 Fed. Reg. 48380 (July 27, 2023) (agreement-based counterclaims), and 89 Fed. Reg. 80743 (Oct. 4, 2024) (certified determinations). The Office summarized the whole structure when it opened the statutorily required study of the Board in CASE Act Study, 90 Fed. Reg. 11626 (Mar. 10, 2025).

The codified rules live in 37 C.F.R. Parts 220 through 234, with fees in 37 C.F.R. § 201.3(g). A map:

Two framing rules matter more than their length suggests. First, the Board "is not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence." 37 C.F.R. § 222.1. Lawyers who reach for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 or a hearsay objection will find no purchase, and the statute itself bars "formal motion practice." § 1506(m). Second, the Board publishes a Copyright Claims Board Handbook that explains its practices but cannot override the statute or rules. 37 C.F.R. § 220.3. The Handbook is genuinely useful, especially for self-represented parties, and the eCCB electronic filing system follows its structure.

Who decides

The Board has three full-time Copyright Claims Officers, appointed by the Librarian of Congress on the Register's recommendation for renewable six-year terms. Each must be a lawyer with at least seven years of experience. Two must have substantial experience evaluating, litigating, or adjudicating infringement claims, and between them must have represented or presided over both owners and users of works; the third must bring alternative dispute resolution experience. § 1502(b). At least two Copyright Claims Attorneys with three or more years of copyright experience support the Officers. They run the compliance review of every claim, answer procedural questions from the public, and tell would-be claimants how to use a DMCA subpoena under § 512(h) to identify an unknown infringer. § 1503(a)(2).

Independence is built in. Officers decide each case on its own record; they may consult the Register on general questions of law but not on the facts of a pending matter or on how the law applies to those facts, and their performance reviews may not consider the outcome of any case. § 1503(b). Parties may not communicate ex parte with the Officers or the Register about the substance of a proceeding. § 1503(f). And actions of the Officers and the Register in connection with a determination are reviewable only under § 1508(c), "and not under chapter 7 of title 5," meaning the Administrative Procedure Act is off the table. § 1503(g); compare 5 U.S.C. § 706.

What the Board can hear, and what it cannot

Three kinds of claims

Section 1504(c) lists everything the Board may decide. A claimant (the "real party in interest" who commences the proceeding, § 1501(1)) may bring one or more of three claims:

1. Infringement of an exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106, brought by "the legal or beneficial owner of the exclusive right at the time of the infringement." § 1504(c)(1). That tracks the standing rule for court actions in 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), so an assignee of a bare right to sue, with no ownership interest, has no better footing here than in court.
2. A declaration of noninfringement, "consistent with" the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. § 1504(c)(2). This is the claim for the café owner who receives a demand letter over a photo and wants a cheap, binding answer. The claim form requires a statement explaining why an actual controversy exists, 37 C.F.R. § 222.2(c)(8)(v), and because the statute ties the claim to § 2201, the natural measure is the all-the-circumstances test of MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
3. DMCA misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), for a takedown notice or counter notice that knowingly and materially misrepresented infringement, with remedies limited to those the chapter allows. § 1504(c)(3). The substantive standards come from the courts: a notice sender must form a subjective good-faith belief of infringement, Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), and must consider fair use before sending it, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).

Multiple claimants may sue multiple respondents in one proceeding, but only if every claim arises "out of the same allegedly infringing activity or continuous course of infringing activities" and the total stays under the cap. § 1504(c)(6). Respondents who acted together may be held jointly and severally liable. § 1504(f).

Counterclaims and defenses

A respondent may counterclaim, but only against the claimant, only within the damages cap, and only if the counterclaim either (a) arises under § 106 or § 512(f) out of the same transaction or occurrence, or (b) arises under an agreement about that transaction that "could affect the relief awarded to the claimant," the classic example being a license the claimant says was exceeded and the respondent says was paid for. § 1504(c)(4). Counterclaims are filed with the response. 37 C.F.R. § 222.9(e). Unlike federal practice, there are no compulsory counterclaims: "The failure or inability to assert a counterclaim" before the Board does not bar asserting it later. § 1507(e).

Every legal or equitable defense remains available, § 1504(c)(5): fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, license, independent creation, lack of originality under Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the statute of limitations, and the rest. Fair use is the defense most often worth a respondent's time, and it is decided on the same four factors a court would apply after Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. 508 (2023). Respondents hoping that a commercial use of a whole photograph will qualify should read Brammer v. Violent Hues Productions, LLC, 922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019) and Philpot v. Independent Journal Review, 92 F.4th 252 (4th Cir. 2024), both rejecting fair use for photographs used essentially as taken to illustrate a website or an article. For the full framework, see Conducting a Fair Use Analysis: A Practical Guide.

What is excluded

Section 1504(d) closes four doors:

• Claims the statute does not list. Because § 1504(c) speaks of exclusive rights "provided under section 106," claims under other provisions fall outside it: removal or falsification of copyright management information under 17 U.S.C. § 1202, anti-circumvention under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, moral rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106A, and freestanding contract or trademark claims. That exclusion has real bite for photographers, whose court complaints often pair infringement with a § 1202(b) count of the kind upheld in Mango v. BuzzFeed, Inc., 970 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2020). The Copyright Office has asked whether § 1202 claims should be added. CASE Act Study, 90 Fed. Reg. 11626 (topic 7).
• Claims already in court. A claim that has been finally adjudicated, or that is pending in a court, is out unless the court stays it so the Board can proceed. § 1504(d)(2). Going the other way, a district court "shall issue a stay" of a claim that is already the subject of a pending or active Board proceeding. § 1509(a).
• Governments. Claims by or against a federal or state governmental entity are excluded. § 1504(d)(3). Claims against the United States belong in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, and states retain sovereign immunity from copyright damages suits under Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248 (2020).
• Foreign respondents. A claim against a person "residing outside of the United States" is excluded unless that person started the proceeding and is facing a counterclaim. § 1504(d)(4). Service is valid only within the United States. § 1506(g)(9). Foreign claimants, by contrast, are welcome, and a meaningful share of claims come from abroad.

Two more filters apply at intake. A claim against an online service provider for hosting, caching, or linking that may fall within a § 512 safe harbor is noncompliant unless the claimant affirms that it first sent a proper takedown notice and the provider failed to act expeditiously. § 1506(f)(1)(C). And the Board must dismiss any claim it finds "unsuitable," for example because a necessary party is missing, essential evidence or expert testimony is unavailable, or the issues exceed the Board's competence. § 1506(f)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 224.2.

The limitations period

A proceeding must be commenced "not later than 3 years after the claim accrued." § 1504(b)(1). That mirrors the court limitations period in 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), and the same accrual doctrines apply: each infringing act starts its own clock under the separate-accrual rule, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), and where a discovery rule applies a timely claim may reach damages for conduct more than three years old, Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. 366 (2024). One feature has no court analogue: a Board proceeding tolls the § 507(b) period for a court action on the same claim while it is pending. § 1504(b)(2). A claimant who files at the Board and then watches the respondent opt out has not lost time against the federal clock. For calendaring discipline, see the Statute of Limitations Diary Checklist.

The money: damages caps, statutory damages, and no willfulness enhancement

The Board can award either actual damages and profits, determined under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), or statutory damages "determined in accordance with section 504(c)," subject to four conditions. § 1504(e)(1)(A). The conditions are the heart of the Board's economics.

A few points deserve emphasis.

The late-registration safety valve. In court, a work registered after the infringement began (and outside the three-month window after publication) earns no statutory damages at all. § 412. At the Board it can still earn up to $7,500. § 1504(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II). For the photographer who registered last week, that is the difference between a claim and no claim. It is also why many respondents who might otherwise stay should run the federal-court comparison carefully: if the claimant's registration was late, the claimant's federal case may be worth only actual damages, and the Board may actually be the more dangerous forum.

No willfulness. The Board "may not make any finding that, or consider whether, the infringement was committed willfully." § 1504(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III). The usual statutory-damages factors that courts apply, such as the expenses saved and profits earned by the infringer, the revenue lost by the owner, deterrence, and the parties' conduct, see Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010), remain relevant, minus the willfulness inquiry, plus one new factor: whether the infringer has agreed to stop. § 1504(e)(1)(A)(ii)(IV). Expect awards to track licensing value far more closely than the punitive multiples federal plaintiffs sometimes demand. On the court-side framework, see Copyright Damages and Remedies: Statutory Damages, Profits, Injunctions, and Fees and 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04.

Counting works. The per-work caps make the number of works decisive, and the ordinary rule that "all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work" applies through § 504(c)(1). The circuits do not count the same way: the Second Circuit treats an album issued as a unit as one work, as Bryant held, while the Ninth Circuit counted separately aired television episodes as separate works in Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997), a case later made famous when the Supreme Court held that the amount of statutory damages is a jury question, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). The Board resolves that kind of split with its own choice-of-law rule, discussed below.

Election and timing. The claimant must elect actual damages and profits, statutory damages, or no damages at all at any time before the final determination, and the Board's schedule may not force an earlier election. § 1504(e)(1)(B); § 1506(k). Electing no damages makes sense when what the claimant really wants is a binding finding of infringement or a recorded agreement to take the image down.

Cessation without an injunction. The Board has no power to enjoin under 17 U.S.C. § 502 or order impoundment under 17 U.S.C. § 503. But if a party agrees on the record to stop the infringing activity, or to stop sending takedown notices found to be knowing misrepresentations, the determination "shall include a requirement to cease conduct." § 1504(e)(2). A respondent's statement of willingness to cease is made in its party statement and is considered only on damages, never on liability. 37 C.F.R. § 222.15(b)(3)(v).

Fees. Each party bears its own fees and costs, § 1504(e)(3), which removes the fee-shifting threat that drives so much federal settlement behavior under 17 U.S.C. § 505, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), and Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197 (2016). The exception is bad-faith conduct, discussed below.

The caps can move. Beginning three years after the Board's first determination (which issued in February 2023), the Register may adjust the monetary limits by rule, but an adjustment takes effect only after a 120-day period during which Congress may disapprove it. § 1510(a)(2). The Office's study notice specifically asked whether the $30,000 and $15,000 caps should be raised or lowered. 90 Fed. Reg. 11626 (topic 7(b)). Anyone advising on a Board matter should confirm the current figures before filing.

Registration: a lower gate, but still a gate

In court, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. 296 (2019) requires that the Copyright Office have acted on the application before the owner sues, although the requirement is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). The Board is more forgiving at the front end. An infringement claim may be filed once the owner "has first delivered a completed application, a deposit, and the required fee" and registration "has either been issued or has not been refused." § 1505(a); 37 C.F.R. § 221.1. The claim lists the registration number or, for a pending application, the service request number. 37 C.F.R. § 222.2(c)(7)(ii).

The back end is firm. The Board "may not render a determination" until a certificate has issued, been filed, and been shared with the other side, who must have a chance to address it. § 1505(b)(1). If the case cannot proceed while the application is pending, the Board holds it in abeyance, and after a year it may dismiss without prejudice on 30 days' notice. § 1505(b)(2). A refusal ends the claim, without prejudice. § 1505(b)(3).

Because ordinary examination can take months, the CASE Act required a faster path. Once a proceeding is active (or once the Board has placed it in abeyance and granted permission), a claimant may request small claims expedited registration through the Board, not through the Office's eCO system, for a separate fee that does not replace the registration fee. The Office "will make every attempt" to examine the application within ten business days but may deny the request if its workload requires. 37 C.F.R. § 221.2. Examination standards do not change. Compare the court-side special handling procedure in the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 623 (3d ed.).

Two more registration rules carry over from court practice. A certificate issued within five years of first publication is prima facie evidence of validity and of the facts stated in it, 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); § 1505(c). And a respondent attacking a registration for inaccuracy must reckon with Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 595 U.S. 178 (2022), which held that a good-faith mistake of law, like a mistake of fact, does not invalidate a registration. Finally, remember why timing still matters even though late registration does not bar a Board claim: the per-work cap is $15,000 only for works timely registered under § 412. For the filing mechanics, see Copyright Registration: A Comprehensive Guide and Registering a Copyright in Photographs: A Practical Checklist.

The opt-out, and the constitutional bargain behind it

How the opt-out works

Nothing about the Board is more important, or more misunderstood, than the opt-out. Participation is "on a voluntary basis," and every party keeps the right to go to court and "to seek a jury trial." § 1504(a). The mechanism that makes participation voluntary runs like this:

1. The claimant serves an official notice. After compliance review, the claimant must serve the respondent with an initial notice the Board prepares, a copy of the claim exactly as approved, and an opt-out form, by personal service or a waiver of personal service. § 1506(g); 37 C.F.R. § 222.3. The notice must state "prominent[ly]" that a respondent who does not opt out within 60 days "loses the opportunity to have the dispute decided by a court created under article III" and "waives the right to a jury trial." § 1506(g)(1).
2. The Board sends its own second notice. Within 20 days after proof of service is filed, the Board mails (and, where it has an address, emails) a separate notice repeating the warnings. § 1506(h); 37 C.F.R. § 222.4(b).
3. The respondent has 60 days from service to opt out, online through eCCB or on the paper form, using the confirmation code that came with the notices. § 1506(i); 37 C.F.R. § 223.1. An online opt-out is due by 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on day 60; a paper opt-out must be postmarked or dispatched by then. Each respondent must opt out separately.
4. Silence makes the case active. If proof of service was filed and no opt-out arrives, "the proceeding shall be deemed an active proceeding and the respondent shall be bound by the determination." § 1506(i).

An opt-out ends the proceeding without prejudice, and the respondent is not bound by anything that follows. § 1507(f). The claimant may not get around it by refiling the same acts under the same theories, which the Board will dismiss unless the respondent agrees to come back, but an opt-out does not cover claims based on different acts or theories. 37 C.F.R. § 223.1(i)-(j). The Board may extend the 60 days only "in exceptional circumstances" and in the interests of justice. § 1506(i). Waiving personal service does not waive the right to opt out, § 1506(g)(7)(A), and a respondent who was improperly served can still opt out effectively. 37 C.F.R. § 223.1(d).

Libraries, archives, and class actions

Two groups get special treatment. A library or archives that qualifies for the exceptions in 17 U.S.C. § 108 may opt out of all Board proceedings in advance, for free, without ever renewing. § 1506(aa). The Office keeps a public list, and the preemptive opt-out covers employees acting within the scope of their employment. 37 C.F.R. § 223.2. And because the Board cannot handle aggregate litigation, a Board proceeding "shall not have any effect on a class action," and a party who learns it is a class member in a related class action must either opt out of the class or seek dismissal of the Board proceeding, within 14 days under the rules. § 1507(b); 37 C.F.R. § 223.3; compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Why consent carries the constitutional weight

The opt-out is not a design flourish; it is what makes the Board constitutional, or at least what Congress bet would. An infringement claim for money is a private-rights dispute of the kind courts heard at common law, and the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury on "all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages," including the amount. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to let Congress move private-rights claims for money into non-Article III tribunals without consent. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), preserved a jury for a fraudulent-transfer suit against a party that had not filed a claim in bankruptcy. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), held that a bankruptcy court could not enter final judgment on a state-law counterclaim. And SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), held that when the SEC seeks civil penalties for securities fraud the defendant is entitled to a jury, because the claim resembles common-law fraud and the "public rights" exception does not reach it. The contrast cases, such as Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) and Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. 325 (2018), involved public rights that Congress may assign to agencies. A photographer's damages claim against a florist is not that.

Consent is the escape hatch, and the CASE Act is built around it. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the Court upheld agency adjudication of a state-law counterclaim because the litigant chose the agency forum, explaining that the personal right to an Article III judge can be waived. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015), held that parties may consent to a bankruptcy judge's adjudication of a Stern claim and that consent need not be express so long as it is knowing and voluntary, building on Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003), which inferred consent to a magistrate judge from a party's conduct after notice of the right to refuse. And Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), upheld binding arbitration of a statutory compensation dispute with judicial review limited to "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct," a template that § 1508(c) closely resembles.

Read against those cases, the double warning in §§ 1506(g)(1) and (h) is the CASE Act's attempt to make silence count as knowing and voluntary consent. Whether it succeeds for a respondent who never opened the envelope is a fair question, and scholars raised versions of it before the Act passed. See Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Copyright Small Claims Tribunal, 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 689 (2018). The statute's answer is layered protection: two notices, a default process in which the claimant must still prove its case and the Board must consider whether the respondent has a meritorious defense, a chance to ask the Board to vacate a default, and district court relief for "excusable neglect." §§ 1506(u), 1508(c)(1)(C). In the court decisions available to us, the question has not been squarely decided; in Santora v. Copyright Claims Board, No. 25-1055 (TJK) (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2026), the court held that a self-represented claimant's scattered constitutional references did not state a claim. For the broader doctrine of agency adjudication, see Administrative Law: Rulemaking, Adjudication, and Judicial Review.

The leading cases, explained

Because Board determinations are not precedent, the cases that shape Board practice come from the courts. Here are the ones a practitioner actually uses, and why.

Santora repays a closer look. A self-published novelist brought a noninfringement and § 512(f) claim against MGM over takedown notices that accused his book of infringing the Addams Family franchise; MGM and the Tee & Charles Addams Foundation counterclaimed that the book infringed the copyright in the Wednesday character. After the claimant skipped a status conference and then failed to answer the counterclaim on the Board's required response form by the deadline, the Board dismissed his claim for failure to prosecute, then found a pattern of bad-faith conduct, including "fabricated quotations from statutory and regulatory provisions," and barred him from filing for a year under § 1506(y)(3). His suit against the Board failed because § 1503(g) routes all review through § 1508(c), and his complaint identified neither a final determination nor facts fitting fraud, excess of authority, or excusable neglect. The court added that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 does not reach conduct in Board proceedings and that the Board is not a "court of the United States" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The lessons: use the forms, meet the deadlines, never invent a quotation, and if you must challenge a determination, plead the statute's grounds.

Whose law applies: the Board and conflicting circuit precedent

The Board decides cases under title 17, "judicial precedent, and applicable regulations." § 1503(b)(1). That raises an obvious problem for a national tribunal: the circuits disagree about important points of copyright law. Section 1506(a)(2) supplies a choice-of-law rule. If precedent conflicts and "cannot be reconciled," the Board follows the law of the federal jurisdiction where the action could have been brought in court, and if there is more than one, the jurisdiction with "the most significant ties to the parties and conduct at issue."

Real conflicts that arise in Board-sized cases include:

• Embedding and the display right. The Ninth Circuit's "server test" holds that a website does not display an image it embeds from someone else's server, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), and it reaffirmed that rule in Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, 73 F.4th 1060 (9th Cir. 2023). A New York district court rejected the server test in Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). An embedding claim against a California blogger and the same claim against a New York publisher may not come out the same way.
• Counting works for statutory damages, discussed above (Bryant in the Second Circuit versus the independent-economic-value approach of Krypton in the Ninth).
• Accrual. Most courts of appeals apply a discovery rule, and the Second Circuit reaffirmed its version in Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. v. RADesign, Inc., 112 F.4th 144 (2d Cir. 2024), but in Nealy the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the rule is correct. The Second Circuit's separate three-year cap on damages in Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., 959 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2020), did not survive Nealy.
• Similarity tests. The Ninth Circuit's extrinsic and intrinsic tests, applied to photographs in Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018), differ in method from the Second Circuit's ordinary-observer and more-discerning-observer approach. The companion article Proving Copyright Infringement: Access, Substantial Similarity, and the Tests Courts Actually Use maps those tests in detail.

The practical consequence is that both sides should build the choice-of-law record from the first filing: where the claimant and respondent reside, where the server sits, where the infringing copies were made and sold. The claim form already asks where the infringement occurred, 37 C.F.R. § 222.2(c)(7)(iii)(F), and a party that expects a split to matter should say so in its party statement rather than leaving the Board to discover it.

How a proceeding actually runs: procedure, timing, and evidence

Everything happens in writing or by video, through the Board's electronic filing and case management system, eCCB. § 1506(c). No one travels to Washington. Deadlines falling on a weekend or federal holiday roll to the next workday, and electronic filings are due by 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time. 37 C.F.R. § 220.4.

The timeline of a standard proceeding

Add up the fixed periods and a contested standard proceeding that runs its full course takes the better part of a year at a minimum, and often longer. The Board's own published statistics decline to promise a timeline, noting that length "can vary based on several factors."

Filing and compliance review

The claim is a fill-in form on eCCB. It identifies the claim type, the parties and their addresses, the works (title, author, registration number or application number, and category of work), the infringing activity (which rights, when it began, who participated, whether it continues, and where it happened), the harm and relief sought, and whether the claimant elects the smaller claims track. It ends with a certification under penalty of perjury. 37 C.F.R. § 222.2(c). A respondent's mailing address is mandatory, unless the claimant certifies that the address is unknown and the limitations period is likely to expire within 30 days, in which case the address must follow within 60 days. 37 C.F.R. § 222.2(c)(6), (f).

A Copyright Claims Attorney then reviews the claim for compliance with the statute and rules, including whether the allegations "clearly do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 37 C.F.R. § 224.1(b)(3). The reviewer accepts the stated facts, conducts no investigation, and treats clearance as no endorsement of the merits. 37 C.F.R. § 224.1(e)-(f). That is a gentler screen than the plausibility standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A deficient claim gets two chances to be fixed, each within 30 days and without another fee; a third failure, confirmed by an Officer, means dismissal without prejudice. § 1506(f)(1)(B).

Service

Service is the claimant's job, and it is where many claims quietly die. An individual may be served personally by any nonparty adult, at home with a resident of suitable age, through an authorized agent, or by any method state law allows for a summons. § 1506(g)(3)-(4). An entity is served through its registered agent or an officer or managing agent, unless it has designated a service agent with the Copyright Office, in which case service goes by certified mail or another method the entity specified. § 1506(g)(5); 37 C.F.R. §§ 222.5(b)(2)(ii), 222.6. A claimant may instead mail a Board-provided waiver request with a prepaid return envelope; the respondent has 30 days to sign and return it, and a respondent who waives gets an extra 30 days to respond if it does not opt out. § 1506(g)(6)-(7). The service packet must contain only the Board's notice, the claim, the opt-out form, and anything else the Board directs: no settlement demand, no cover letter arguing the merits, no extra exhibits. 37 C.F.R. § 222.3(b). Anyone used to federal practice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 will find the methods familiar; for the field mechanics, see Service of Process: Domestic and International Methods That Work.

Discovery without depositions

Once the proceeding is active, discovery uses the Board's standard interrogatories and standard document requests, tailored to the claim type. 37 C.F.R. §§ 225.2-225.3. A claimant asserting infringement must explain ownership, creation, publication, access, discovery of the infringement, harm, and its pre-filing efforts to stop the use; a respondent must explain its own creation story, dissemination, defenses, and its revenues and deductible expenses from the accused use. Documents include electronically stored information, but a party need not search beyond what "a layperson" could easily do or hire a vendor. 37 C.F.R. § 225.3(h)(2). Communications with counsel about the merits need not be produced or logged. 37 C.F.R. § 225.3(i).

Everything else is the exception. Additional discovery requires good cause and a narrow request; requests for admission are "disfavored" and need leave; expert testimony is "highly disfavored" and allowed only when the case "cannot fairly proceed" without it; and "[d]epositions shall not be permitted." 37 C.F.R. § 225.4. Compare the federal toolkit in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Rule 30, and Rule 36. The Board's enforcement tool is the adverse inference: after notice and a chance to respond, it may infer disputed facts against a party that failed to provide proper discovery. § 1506(n)(3). Confidential material can be protected under a standard protective order. 37 C.F.R. § 222.19.

Evidence and written testimony

The Board admits evidence "without application of formal rules of evidence." § 1506(o). Testimony comes in writing, under penalty of perjury, from parties and nonexpert witnesses. Each side files documentary evidence with an index explaining how each document bears on the claim, sworn witness statements in numbered paragraphs limited to personal knowledge, and a party statement of no more than 12 pages; the claimant's reply is limited to rebuttal and seven pages. 37 C.F.R. § 222.15. Facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence. § 1506(s).

Informality cuts both ways. Hearsay objections will not exclude a printout, but an undated screenshot with no URL is still weak proof, and the Officers know it. The authentication logic of Fed. R. Evid. 901 no longer binds anyone, but it remains the best guide to what persuades: who captured the page, when, how, and whether anything was altered. See Capturing the Web: A Practitioner's Guide to Authenticating Website Screenshots as Evidence in Federal Court.

The Board may hold a hearing, always virtual and attended by at least two Officers, but it decides whether one is needed. § 1506(p); 37 C.F.R. § 222.16. The determination must be reached by a majority, explain its factual and legal basis in writing, set out any agreed cessation and any settlement terms the parties asked it to adopt, and state all damages and other relief clearly. § 1506(t)(1). Final determinations are posted on a public website, and other Board information is exempt from FOIA requests, § 1506(t)(3)-(4); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), although the rules let anyone inspect the docket through eCCB except material designated confidential. 37 C.F.R. § 229.1(b).

The smaller claims track

A claimant seeking no more than $5,000, exclusive of fees and costs, may elect the smaller claims procedure. § 1506(z); 37 C.F.R. Part 226. The election is made in the claim and may be changed freely before service, but afterwards only with the other parties' consent and the Board's leave. 37 C.F.R. § 226.2. Counterclaims in a smaller claim are also capped at $5,000. 37 C.F.R. § 226.3. Nearly half of all claims (47 percent through March 2026) have been filed this way.

The track is genuinely different, not just cheaper. A single Officer presides. An initial conference replaces the pre-discovery conference, and there is no standard discovery; the Officer orders only the documents and information needed to decide the case. Each side files its evidence 14 days before a "merits conference," with an optional statement of no more than seven pages and any witness statements, and an opposing party may ask that a witness appear to answer questions. After the conference the Officer serves proposed findings of fact, the parties get 21 days and five pages to respond, and then the Officer issues the final determination. Expert testimony is not allowed at all. 37 C.F.R. § 226.4. The result has the same effect as a determination by the full Board. § 1506(z).

Defaults, failure to prosecute, and bad-faith conduct

Respondent default. If a respondent in an active proceeding stops participating, the Board does not simply enter judgment. It sends a notice, through eCCB and by mail and every known email address, giving the respondent 30 days to cure, and a second notice if 15 days pass in silence. A respondent may cure missed deadlines at least twice before default proceedings begin. 37 C.F.R. § 227.1. The claimant must then submit written direct testimony, and the Board must decide whether the evidence actually supports a finding for the claimant, considering whether the respondent has a meritorious defense. If the evidence falls short, the Board proposes dismissal without prejudice; if it suffices, the Board serves a proposed default determination and gives the respondent another 30 days to respond. Only then does the default become final, and even then the respondent may ask the Board to vacate it within 30 days, or seek district court relief for excusable neglect. § 1506(u); 37 C.F.R. §§ 227.2-227.5; § 1508(c)(1)(C). This is a far more protective process than default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, and it is part of the constitutional story told above.

Claimant failure to proceed. A claimant who does not complete service within 90 days loses the respondent, without prejudice. § 1506(v)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 228.1. A claimant who stops prosecuting an active case gets notice and 30 days, and then a dismissal with prejudice, possibly with a fee award. § 1506(v)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 228.2(d). Withdrawal has a similar trap: a claimant who withdraws before the response gets a dismissal without prejudice, but one who withdraws after the response gets a final determination dismissing the claim with prejudice, unless the Board finds otherwise in the interests of justice or the parties stipulate. 37 C.F.R. § 222.17. Claimants who plan to "test" the Board and then move to court need to understand those rules before filing.

Bad faith. Every participant certifies that its submissions are not for an improper purpose and have legal and factual support, a Rule 11 analogue. 37 C.F.R. § 232.2. Bad-faith conduct means pursuing a claim, counterclaim, or defense "for a harassing or other improper purpose, or without a reasonable basis in law or fact." § 1506(y)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 220.1(c). The Board must then award reasonable fees and costs to the adversely affected party unless that would be unjust, capped at $5,000, or $2,500 in costs only if the injured party represented itself, with the caps lifted in extraordinary circumstances such as a pattern of bad faith. § 1506(y)(2). A participant found to have acted in bad faith more than once within 12 months is barred from filing claims for a year, its pending claims are dismissed (active ones only with the respondent's consent), and a lawyer or authorized representative can be barred from representing anyone before the Board for the same period. § 1506(y)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 232.4. Santora shows the bar in action.

Volume limits. To keep the docket from being captured by high-volume filers, a claimant (with its corporate affiliates) may file no more than 30 proceedings in any 12-month period, an individual lawyer no more than 40, and a law firm no more than 80. Law school clinics are exempt. 37 C.F.R. § 233.2.

What a determination is worth: preclusion, review, and enforcement

Narrow preclusion and no precedent

A final determination, including a default, precludes the parties from relitigating "the claims and counterclaims asserted and finally determined," before any court or the Board. § 1507(a). It does not create issue preclusion for other claims, its findings on ownership bind no one in any other proceeding, and it "may not be cited or relied upon as legal precedent." § 1507(a)(1)-(3). Party submissions and witness statements may not be used as the basis of other copyright proceedings either. § 1507(c). That is considerably narrower than ordinary preclusion doctrine, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17-19, 27 (1982), and Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and the Preclusive Effect of Judgments. For a respondent, it means a loss at the Board does not hand future claimants a finding to use offensively. For a claimant with many works or many infringers, it means each win must be earned separately.

The DMCA counter-notice rule

One provision gives Board claims leverage outside the Board. When a user files a DMCA counter-notice, the platform must restore the material in 10 to 14 business days unless the copyright owner files "an action seeking a court order to restrain" the user. § 512(g)(2)(C). An infringement claim at the Board counts as that action if the claimant notifies the provider's designated agent before restoration and the claim covers the material identified in the takedown. § 1507(d). An owner can therefore keep disputed content down for the price of a Board filing rather than a federal complaint, a point worth knowing for anyone working through How to File a DMCA Takedown Notice (And Respond to One).

Reconsideration, the Register, and the district court

Review proceeds in three narrow steps:

1. Reconsideration within 30 days, for "a clear error of law or fact material to the outcome, or a technical mistake," in no more than 12 pages and generally without new evidence. § 1506(w); 37 C.F.R. Part 230.
2. Register's review within 30 days after reconsideration is denied, for a fee, limited to whether the Board "abused its discretion in denying reconsideration." The Register may deny review or remand for an amended determination. § 1506(x); 37 C.F.R. Part 231.
3. District court within 90 days after the final determination or the end of the Register's review, and only to vacate, modify, or correct a determination issued through fraud, corruption, misrepresentation, or other misconduct; one in which the Board exceeded its authority or failed to decide the subject matter; or, for a default or failure-to-prosecute determination, one resulting from excusable neglect. § 1508(c)(1). A court may stay enforcement while the challenge is pending. § 1508(c)(2)(B).

The structure will look familiar to arbitration lawyers: like the Federal Arbitration Act's vacatur grounds in 9 U.S.C. § 10, which the Supreme Court treated as exclusive in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), § 1508(c) does not permit review for ordinary legal error. See Confirming and Vacating Arbitration Awards: The Narrow Door of FAA Review.

Confirmation and collection

The Board cannot collect money. If a losing party fails to pay or comply, the winner may, within one year, apply to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia "or any other appropriate district court" for an order confirming the award and reducing it to judgment, attaching a certified copy of the determination and a declaration under penalty of perjury. § 1508(a)-(b); 37 C.F.R. § 229.2. The court "shall grant such order" unless the determination has been vacated, modified, or corrected, and it "shall impose" on the noncomplying party the reasonable expenses of getting the order, including attorney's fees. § 1508(a). That fee-shifting rule is the CASE Act's quiet enforcement weapon: ignoring a Board award converts a modest debt into a federal judgment plus the winner's fees, collectible by execution under Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 with post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The process resembles confirmation of an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 9; for what happens after judgment, see Collecting a Judgment: Discovery in Aid of Execution, Liens, Levies, and Garnishment.

How the first years have gone

The Board publishes cumulative statistics. Its March 2026 release, covering June 2022 through March 2026, is the best available picture of how the forum is actually used. (Copyright Claims Board, Key Statistics (updated Mar. 2026).)

Four things stand out.

The biggest obstacle is the claimant's own paperwork. Compliance-review dismissals (787) and service failures (272) together account for more than half of all claims filed. With two-thirds of claimants representing themselves, that is not surprising, and it is the most fixable problem in the system. A claim that is specific, attaches its evidence, names the right legal entity, and is served promptly by a professional process server avoids both traps.

Opt-outs matter, but they are not the main way claims end. Respondents opted out of 168 proceedings, about as many as settled (155). Many of the 154 withdrawals may also reflect private deals, though the Board does not know. The opt-out remains the single most important strategic decision in any served case, but the Board's numbers do not show respondents reflexively walking away.

Decisions on the merits are rare, and nearly half come by default. Only 47 proceedings ended in a final determination on the merits, and 22 of those were default determinations. A claimant who expects a contested hearing is planning for the exception.

Visual works dominate. Photographs, illustrations, and other pictorial and graphic works make up more than a third of the docket, and motion pictures (which include online video) more than a quarter. That matches the Board's design: it is built for the small, recurring, image-driven disputes of the internet economy.

The first final determination issued on February 15, 2023, adopting the parties' settlement in Flores v. Mitrakos, No. 22-CCB-0035, and the first determination not based on a settlement followed on February 28, 2023, in Oppenheimer v. Prutton, No. 22-CCB-0045. See CASE Act Study, 90 Fed. Reg. 11626. The CASE Act required the Register to study the Board within three years of that first determination, and the March 2025 notice of inquiry previews where change may come: whether the $40 initial fee deters frivolous claims, whether compliance review and service rules should be simplified, whether the opt-out and default processes are working, whether bad-faith sanctions are long enough, whether claims under § 1202 should be added, whether the caps should move, whether the Board needs subpoena power to identify anonymous online infringers, and whether it should offer mediation. Anyone practicing before the Board should watch for the resulting report and any rulemaking that follows.

Strategy for claimants and respondents

What it costs compared with federal court

For claimants

1. Decide what you want. Money within the caps, a recorded promise to stop, or a binding declaration are all available. An injunction, relief against a foreign or government defendant, a § 1202 claim, or a ruling with precedential value are not.
2. Run the forum math honestly. If your registration was timely and the infringer is a solvent business, the federal threat of statutory damages plus fees may produce a better settlement than the Board can. If your registration was late, the Board's $7,500-per-work statutory damages may be the best remedy you have anywhere.
3. Think about the respondent's math, too. A respondent decides whether to opt out by comparing its exposure in each forum and its guess about whether you will really sue in court. A self-represented claimant with a late registration is easy to ignore; a claimant with timely registrations and a lawyer is not.
4. Send a demand first, separately. A short, professional letter that identifies the work, attaches proof, proposes a license fee, and mentions both the Board and federal court resolves many disputes without any filing. Just keep it out of the service packet. 37 C.F.R. § 222.3(b). See Drafting a Demand Letter: A Practical Checklist.
5. Choose the track deliberately. If your realistic recovery is under $5,000, the smaller claims procedure is faster and simpler. If you have several works or provable actual damages, keep the standard track.
6. Write for compliance review. Name the respondent's legal entity, give a real address, list every registration or application number, describe exactly what was copied and where, attach the evidence, and, for a platform defendant, confirm the prior takedown notice.
7. Serve fast and file proof faster. Use a process server or a waiver request, and file proof within seven days of service.
8. Keep the federal option alive. The Board proceeding tolls the federal limitations period while it is pending. § 1504(b)(2). If the respondent opts out, decide promptly whether to sue.
9. Collect through § 1508. An unpaid award should be confirmed within a year; the statute makes the noncomplying party pay your costs of doing so.

For respondents: when to opt out, and when not to

The opt-out decision is a comparison of two worlds.

Opting out is usually right when:

• The claimant's registration was not timely under § 412, so in court the claimant could recover only actual damages and profits and no fees. Staying at the Board exposes you to up to $7,500 per work in statutory damages you could never face in court.
• The claimant is unlikely to sue in federal court because of cost, distance, or a weak case.
• You need a court ruling with precedential value, for instance because the claim attacks a business practice you use thousands of times, such as embedding.
• The claim is one of many related claims and you want them resolved together, in one forum, with full discovery.

Staying is often right when:

• The claimant's registration was timely and the claimant (or its lawyer) is credible about suing. In court you would face statutory damages of up to $30,000 per work, or $150,000 if a jury finds willfulness, plus a possible fee award under § 505, plus your own defense costs. At the Board the ceiling is $30,000 total and each side pays its own way.
• You have a strong defense (a license, fair use, independent creation) and want a cheap, binding resolution. A win precludes the claimant from relitigating the claims decided. § 1507(a).
• You want to settle with structure. The Board offers settlement conferences before an Officer who will not decide the case and will adopt agreed terms into a final determination on request. § 1506(r); 37 C.F.R. § 222.18.
• You have your own claim to press, such as a counterclaim under a license agreement or a declaration of noninfringement.

Before deciding, check the public docket for the claimant's history, tell your insurer (media liability and some general liability policies may respond, and carriers often want a say before you make forum choices), and preserve the evidence, including web pages and licensing records, whatever you decide. For the general approach to incoming demands, see Responding to a Cease and Desist Letter: A Practical Guide.

Common mistakes

Claimants:

1. Filing before a complete registration application, deposit, and fee are on file with the Office. § 1505(a).
2. Naming a trade name, a website, or the web designer instead of the legal entity that used the work.
3. Including a settlement demand or argument in the service packet. 37 C.F.R. § 222.3(b).
4. Missing the 90-day service deadline or the seven-day proof-of-service deadline.
5. Asserting claims the Board cannot hear, or suing a platform without first sending a DMCA notice. § 1506(f)(1)(C).
6. Withdrawing after the respondent answers, which normally ends the claim with prejudice. 37 C.F.R. § 222.17(c).
7. Ignoring a scheduling order, which risks dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
8. Demanding federal-court numbers in a forum that caps statutory damages at $15,000 per work and ignores willfulness.
9. Inventing or exaggerating legal authority, which is bad-faith conduct with real penalties.

Respondents:

1. Ignoring the notice. The default process is protective, but it ends with a binding, enforceable determination.
2. Assuming an opt-out ends the dispute. It ends the Board proceeding; the claimant may still sue, and the limitations period was tolled.
3. Opting out the wrong way: by letter or email instead of the Board's form with the confirmation code, or after the deadline.
4. Failing to register for eCCB within 14 days of the Board's order once the case becomes active. 37 C.F.R. § 222.7.
5. Holding back a counterclaim; counterclaims are due with the response unless the Board allows a later filing for good cause. 37 C.F.R. § 222.9(e).
6. Burying the other side in irrelevant documents, which the rules treat as possible bad faith. 37 C.F.R. § 225.3(h)(3).

A worked example: a photographer's claim from filing through determination

Suppose Maya Ortiz, a food photographer in Portland, publishes a photograph called Pear Tart, Late Light on her portfolio site on April 2. On May 20 she files a group registration for her published photographs from that spring, so her effective date of registration falls within three months of publication and the image is timely registered for § 412 purposes. She licenses comparable images for commercial web use at $500 to $750 a year and has the invoices to prove it.

The next January she finds the image as the homepage banner of Ridgeline Bakehouse, a two-location bakery in Boise, and in several of its Instagram posts going back to November. Her emailed demand for a $1,500 retroactive license goes unanswered. A contingency lawyer tells her the case is too small to take on in federal court.

Choosing the forum and the track. Maya files with the Board. She has one work, so her ceiling on the standard track would be $15,000, but her honest estimate of a likely award is a few thousand dollars, so she elects the smaller claims procedure and accepts the $5,000 cap. The election also lowers the bakery's worst case, which makes an opt-out less attractive. She pays $40 and files on Day 0.

Compliance review. On Day 21 a Copyright Claims Attorney finds the claim deficient: it says only that the bakery "stole my photo," without identifying the exclusive rights at issue, where the copying occurred, or the registration details. Maya amends on Day 35, naming Ridgeline Bakehouse LLC (the legal entity, which she found in the Idaho Secretary of State's records), listing the reproduction and public display rights, giving URLs and capture dates, adding her registration number, and attaching screenshots, the deposit copy, and her license invoices. On Day 49 the claim is found compliant.

Service and the opt-out window. A process server delivers the Board's notice, the claim, and the opt-out form to the LLC's registered agent on Day 60 for $85, and Maya files proof of service two days later. The Board mails its second notice. The bakery's owner pays a copyright lawyer for an hour of advice. The lawyer explains that in federal court Maya's timely registration would support statutory damages of up to $30,000, more if willfulness were found, plus a possible fee award, while at the Board the bakery's maximum exposure is $5,000 and each side pays its own costs. The photo was plainly copied; the bakery's web designer had pulled it from an image search. The bakery does not opt out, and it takes the banner down the same week. Its own claim against the web designer is not a permissible counterclaim (it is not against the claimant), so it reserves that for later. The opt-out window closes on Day 120.

The active phase. Within 14 days of the Board's order, Maya pays the $60 second installment and both parties register on eCCB. The scheduling order sets a 30-day deadline for the response. The bakery admits the use, says it believed the designer had licensed the image, and states that it has stopped and will agree to a cease requirement. At the initial conference the presiding Officer walks through the process, raises settlement (Maya asks $2,500; the bakery offers $750; no deal), and orders two narrow productions: the designer's emails about the image and Maya's licensing invoices.

Merits conference and findings. Fourteen days before the merits conference, each side files its evidence. Maya submits the registration certificate, the deposit, dated screenshots of the website and Instagram posts, three invoices, and a six-page statement electing statutory damages. The bakery submits the designer's emails, a witness statement from the owner, and a short statement. At the conference the Officer asks Maya how she prices web licenses and asks the owner when he first learned of the claim. A month later the Officer serves proposed findings of fact: infringement of the reproduction and display rights in one timely registered work, roughly fourteen months of commercial use, a typical license value of about $650 a year, and the bakery's agreement to cease. Neither side's five-page response changes the picture.

Determination and payment. About a year after filing, the Officer issues a final determination awarding $2,000 in statutory damages and recording the bakery's agreement to stop using the photograph. The explanation tracks the statute: license value, duration, and commercial use support the figure; willfulness is not considered; the agreement to cease weighs modestly in the bakery's favor. The bakery pays within 30 days. Had it refused, Maya could have applied to a district court within a year to confirm the award, and the court would have added her reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, to the judgment. § 1508(a).

The ledger. Maya spent $100 in fees, $85 on service, and perhaps twenty hours of her own time to recover $2,000 and a binding promise. The bakery paid $2,000, plus about $400 for legal advice, and closed the matter without a federal lawsuit or a fee award. The counterfactual is instructive: if the bakery had opted out, Maya's limitations clock would have been tolled while the claim was pending, § 1504(b)(2), and her timely registration would have made the federal fee-shifting statute a credible threat, which is exactly why the bakery's lawyer advised staying.

Frequently asked questions

Do I need a lawyer? No. Parties may appear on their own, through a lawyer, or through a supervised law student working pro bono. § 1506(d). A business may appear through an owner, officer, partner, member, or authorized employee who certifies authority to bind it. 37 C.F.R. § 232.6. The Board's pro bono directory lists law school clinics that take Board cases. 37 C.F.R. § 234.2.

Can I file if my work is not registered yet? Yes, if the Office has received your complete application, deposit, and fee and has not refused registration. The Board will not decide the case until the certificate issues. § 1505.

What happens if I ignore a Board notice? If proof of service is filed and you do not opt out within 60 days, the case goes forward without you. After notices and a review of the claimant's evidence, the Board can issue a default determination that is binding and enforceable in federal court.

If I opt out, can I still be sued? Yes. Opting out ends the Board proceeding only. The claimant may file in federal court, and the time the Board claim was pending does not count against the claimant's limitations period. § 1504(b)(2).

Can the Board order my photo taken down? It cannot issue an injunction, but if the respondent agrees on the record to stop, the determination will include that requirement. § 1504(e)(2). For content on a platform, a takedown notice under § 512 is usually faster, and a Board claim can keep content down after a counter-notice. § 1507(d).

Can I sue someone in another country? Not as a respondent. Respondents must reside in the United States, and service must occur here. §§ 1504(d)(4), 1506(g)(9). Foreign claimants may file against U.S. respondents.

Are Board decisions public? Final determinations are posted publicly and the docket can be viewed through eCCB, but determinations cannot be cited as precedent. §§ 1506(t)(3), 1507(a)(3).

Can I appeal a loss? Only narrowly: reconsideration by the Board, then review by the Register for abuse of discretion, then a district court challenge limited to fraud or misconduct, action beyond the Board's authority, or excusable neglect in a default. §§ 1506(w)-(x), 1508(c).

How long does it take, and what does it cost? The filing fees total $100. A contested proceeding usually takes about a year or more; a claim that settles early or ends in an opt-out is over in a few months.

Practical takeaways

• The Board is a real remedy for small, well-documented infringements, especially of photographs and other visual works, and a poor fit for anything needing an injunction, discovery from third parties, or precedent.
• Most claims fail on paperwork and service, not on the merits. Specific claims, correct respondent names, and professional service solve most of that.
• For respondents, the opt-out decision turns on the claimant's registration timing and credibility about suing. Late registration usually favors opting out; timely registration and a credible claimant usually favor staying.
• Damages are capped and willfulness is irrelevant, so value claims by license fees, duration, and scope of use, not by federal-court multiples.
• Missed deadlines are expensive in both directions: a claimant who stops prosecuting loses the claim with prejudice, and a respondent who stops participating risks a default.
• Determinations bind only the parties, on the claims decided, and set no precedent, which limits both the risk of losing and the value of winning.
• Unpaid awards should be confirmed in district court within a year, where the statute adds the winner's enforcement costs.
• Watch for changes: the Register's three-year study and the authority to adjust the caps both came due in 2026.

This document is general information, not legal advice for any particular situation; the law changes, and the facts matter.

Related Documents

Related Articles

• Copyright Damages and Remedies: Statutory Damages, Profits, Injunctions, and Fees: the federal-court remedies the Board's caps are measured against.
• Proving Copyright Infringement: Access, Substantial Similarity, and the Tests Courts Actually Use: the merits standards the Board applies under its choice-of-law rule.
• Copyright in AI-Assisted Works: Human Authorship, Thaler v. Perlmutter, and the Copyright Office Guidance: registration and authorship questions that can surface in a Board claim.
• How to File a DMCA Takedown Notice (And Respond to One): the notice-and-takedown system that § 512(f) claims and § 1507(d) interact with.
• Confirming and Vacating Arbitration Awards: The Narrow Door of FAA Review: the closest analogue to § 1508 review and confirmation.
• Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and the Preclusive Effect of Judgments: the general doctrine that § 1507 deliberately narrows.
• Small Claims Court: Suing and Defending Without a Lawyer: how state small claims courts work, and why they cannot hear copyright claims.

Related Guides

• Bringing or Defending a Claim Before the Copyright Claims Board: A Practical Guide: the step-by-step companion to this article for both sides.
• Conducting a Fair Use Analysis: A Practical Guide: the defense respondents raise most often.
• Copyright Registration: A Comprehensive Guide: how to register in time to preserve the higher per-work cap.
• Identifying an Anonymous Defendant Online: A Practical Guide: what to do when you cannot name the infringer the Board requires you to serve.
• Responding to a Cease and Desist Letter: A Practical Guide: the first move for a business that receives a demand before any Board claim.

Related Checklists

• Copyright Claims Board Filing and Opt-Out Checklist: A Practical Checklist: every deadline and decision point on one page.
• Copyright Infringement Claim Evaluation Checklist: A Practical Checklist: screening the merits before choosing a forum.
• Registering a Copyright in Photographs: A Practical Checklist: group registration mechanics for the Board's most common claimants.
• Drafting a Demand Letter: A Practical Checklist: the pre-filing letter that settles many Board-sized disputes.

Related Toolkits

• Copyright Claims Board Toolkit: Claim Statements, Opt-Out Decisions, and Settlement Templates: model claim narratives, an opt-out decision memo, and settlement templates.
• Copyright Enforcement and DMCA Toolkit: A Roadmap and Research Guide: the broader enforcement workflow in which the Board is one option.
• Award Enforcement Toolkit: Petitions, Vacatur Motions, and Judgment Collection: templates adaptable to confirming and collecting a Board award.